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Abstract
Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis is widely thought to be one of the most important
texts to emerge in late medieval Europe. Initially purposed as a defense of Holy Roman Emperor
Ludwig IV’s rights against the claim of the papacy’s claim to possess a ‘plenitude of power’,
Defensor pacis is one of the most sophisticated arguments against the centuries of abuse of papal
authority. Marsilius, though condemned as a heretic during his lifetime, remains a pivotal figure
for medieval and early modern European historians, and is perhaps best remembered by the ways
that his ideology influenced subsequent generations of political thinkers. Along that thread, this
thesis examines the translation of Defensor pacis into English during the reign of King Henry
VIII, just over two centuries after it was originally written in Latin. Through this examination,
with the support of secondary literature, I will hope to determine the ways in which Marsilius’
tract was appropriated or changed to reflect the political and religious realities of Reformation
England.
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Introduction
As Europe evolved from the vast Medieval period into a more discernable modern era, a
prominent theme of this transition was the adoption of more critical attitudes toward the
relationship between the papacy and secular monarchies. In the centuries leading up to the
Protestant Reformation, a tireless debate arose between apologists for both sides. This was not a
dispute between two distinct powers, but one that pitted separate national monarchies against the
Roman bishopric. At the heart of the issue was the need to determine the proper relationship
between the terms regnum and sacerdotium. As papal advocates would use entrenched Catholic
scriptural tradition to argue, regnum, or temporal authority that belonged to earthly princes, was
subordinate to the spiritual authority, or sacerdotium, which was ultimately possessed by the
Roman bishop. Therefore, the spiritual authority encompassed the temporal, and the papacy laid
claim to supreme coercive jurisdiction over secular princes.
The tension that existed between these powers was the result of centuries of the
consolidation of papal authority, often at the expense of national rulers. A term that was
frequently adopted in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries to characterize this authority
was the ancient notion of plenitudo potestatis, or fullness or plenitude of power.1 This power was
all-encompassing, and placed the pope in a position of supreme authority in all matters spiritual
and earthly. As he addressed Pope Eugenius III about this plenitudo potestatis, Bernard of
Clairvaux wrote that “[t]he power of others is confined within certain limits, [but] yours extends
even over those who have themselves received power over others.”2 A popular way that supreme
papal authority was justified was that “inasmuch…as spiritual things, which justify secular
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things, are worthier than secular things, so the priesthood is of greater dignity than the kingship,
which it constitutes and ordains.”3 Therefore, since the pope was the highest authority of a more
distinguished cause, his power exceeded that of the authorities of lesser, or temporal, causes.
This theorized expansion of papal power was notably expressed in 1302 with the Bull Unam
sanctam, written by Pope Boniface VIII in an assertion of absolute authority over Philip IV of
France. In the famous bull, Boniface uses the Catholic interpretative tradition of the spiritual and
temporal swords in Luke 22 to conclude that the temporal (i.e. the secular authority) should be
subject to the spiritual, and therefore that “it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every
human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff.”4
The publication of this bull was met with staunch opposition not only in France, but in
other parts of the continent. The overarching purpose of these writers was to mediate the
relationship between regnum and sacerdotium, the conflicted nature of which threatened the
tranquility and peace of kingdoms. What the papacy claimed was an absolute coercive authority
over all Christian realms, which was something that polemicists for national monarchs argued
was a threat to their jurisdictional power. Philip IV of France had John of Paris write an
immediate response to Unam sanctam, entitled Tractatus de regia potestate et papali (On Royal
and Papal Power), which was released in late 1302. In his tract, John rejects the entrenched idea
of Christendom as an enmeshed political-ecclesiastical society. He conceded that the spiritual
authority may well have more dignity than the secular, but any superiority of one over the other
was contained within that spiritual authority, and that in terms of temporal matters, they were
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independent.5 A similar cause was taken up by Dante Aligheri between 1309 and 1313, who
wrote against the papacy in support of the Holy Roman Emperor and the Italian city-states. In his
De monarchia, Dante appeals to the restoration of ‘the quietude and tranquility of peace’, and
places the conflict between the papacy and secular monarchs as the primary obstruction to that
cause. Of the two final goals for man to achieve in this life, one was salvation in the life to come,
and the other was happiness in this present life, which could be obtained under unhindered and
just Imperial rule, and was threatened by the papal usurpation of secular jurisdiction. He
concludes that ‘only under a Monarchy is mankind self-dependent and not dependent on
another’.6 In these writings as with others, as Quentin Skinner explains, we begin to see the early
ruminations of modern European statehood, the evolution of which was dependent on how the
conflicting notions of regnum and sacerdotium were reconciled.
It was in this pregnant context of caesaropapism that the primary text of this thesis was
produced: the Defensor pacis of Marsilius of Padua. The early life of Marsilius is difficult for
historians to trace. It is certain that he was born in Padua between the years 1275-80, to a family
of lawyers. Other than that, he prominently appears in 1313 as the rector of the University of
Paris, and was involved in pro-imperial politics by 1319.7 The imperio-papal dispute intensified
at this time over the election of Ludwig IV of Bavaria as King of the Romans in 1314. While the
decision was split between the electors of the Holy Roman Empire, the title King of the Romans
was a preliminary designation, and tradition required that he crowned by the pope to officially
become Emperor. This proved to be an issue, as Pope John XXII had thrown his support behind
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the other electors who had chosen in favor of Frederick of Austria. This was not to deter Ludwig
IV, who assumed the royal title after his victory in the 1322 battle of Mühldorf. He was promptly
threatened with excommunication, which went into effect in 1324 along with John XXII’s
condemnation of Ludwig as a heretic.8 This episode was a direct exercise of the conflicting
powers that both the emperors and popes claimed to possess. Ludwig IV had the advantage of
military strength on his side, while John XXII wielded his threat of excommunication to achieve
his political ambitions. As an answer to this perceived overreach of papal authority, Marsilius
wrote the Defensor pacis, which was completed in the same year as Ludwig’s excommunication.
As Francis Oakley points out, Marsilius’ Defensor pacis is perhaps the most impressive
work of political philosophy that was produced in the middle ages.9 This assertion is a tribute to
its considerable size as well as its revolutionary nature. The text is broken into three parts, or
discourses, of varying size, and reflects a remarkable synthesis of ancient philosophy with the
contemporary realities of the Italian city-states to provide an original argument against the
usurpation of imperial jurisdiction by the papacy. It seems that while he briefly studied medicine
at Padua prior to his re-location to Paris, Marsilius gained a broad understanding of Aristotle,
which had recently been extensively translated and provided a new way of thinking about the
ways in which cities could be governed.10 In the first discourse, therefore, Marsilius lays out a
political theory that is heavily influenced by Aristotle and sympathetic to the intricacies of his
world of origin. Similar to Dante in De monarchia, Marsilius draws from Aristotle’s Politics to
explain that the central goal of a civil community is not only to live, but to live well, which
derives from a state of peace and tranquility.11 He then explains the causes of strife that Aristotle
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lists that prevent civil communities from attaining that tranquility, such as when individuals put
their own needs above those of the community, before amending this with a ‘singular cause of
strife’. This amendment is necessary because this ‘singular cause of strife’ (which he later
defines as usurpation of political authority by Roman bishops) did not exist at the time of
Aristotle, and it is therefore Marsilius’ purpose “to lift the veil in such a way that it can hereafter
be easily excluded from all realms and civil orders” so that “virtuous princes and subjects can
live in tranquility more securely.”12 Therefore, Marsilius would perhaps have best viewed his
work as an amendment to the Politics, picking up with the philosopher’s logic and applying it to
an issue that Aristotle pre-dated.
With his purpose stated, Marsilius uses the rest of the first discourse to enumerate his
political theory. While he spends some time enumerating the essential functions and offices of a
civil community, the most important part of for his argument, and indeed regarding the papalimperial dispute, is the coercive power of the community. For Marsilius, as with Aristotle, the
sovereign authority of a community rests in the community itself. The legislative expression of
the will of the community is the ‘human legislator’, which he defines as “the people or the
universal body of the citizens or else its prevailing part.13 There is a strong electoral distinction
in this claim, as the ‘prevailing part’ is added to reflect the will of the majority if, as is almost
always the case, the entire community can not agree on one decision. Marsilius’ strong
subscription to Aristotle in this political construction is not surprising, considering the medieval
government of Padua from which he originated. The city was largely governed by a consiglio
maggiore, a council of around 5,000 individuals that would have been relatively highly
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representative of the will of the community.14 In fact, much of the first discourse is focused on
proving that an electoral political system is the best way to reflect the will of the people. He
explains in chapter nine that while certain kinds of monarchies have their advantages and
disadvantages, “the elected kind of principate is superior to the non-elected,” because “election
can never fail, so long as the human race does not.”15 Any other form of government would be
inferior and unjust, because anything that is instituted by a form other than election does not
reflect the will of the universal body of citizens, to which Marsilius believes there is no superior.
The second discourse of Defensor pacis is by far the longest of the three. Well over half
of the book, this discourse is where Marsilius takes his political theory and uses it, along with
scriptures and interpretations of the saints, in an attempt to arrive at the truth of the papal abuse
of power. He uses these interpretations to argue, among other things, that it was never the will of
Christ for Peter or any of his successors to hold coercive jurisdiction on this earth, and that Christ
actually forbade it.16 Instead, any powers that bishops possess are purely sacramental, such as the
binding and loosing of sins, though no bishop is superior to another in this regard.17 Marsilius
maintains that the coercive jurisdiction in temporal matters so often claimed by popes belongs to
the human legislator alone, or the prince by its authority, while any disputes over spiritual
matters should be resolved by a general council of the faithful.18 The result is an unprecedented
effort that exposes the papacy for all of the faults that Marsilius believes are contrary to
scripture. He completely denies the primacy of the Roman bishop, and presents the practices of
the Church against the standard of poverty to which they are called. The coercive jurisdiction
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that he strips away from the pope is then granted to the ultimate secular prince, or more
specifically, the Holy Roman Emperor for whom he writes. As Oakley mentions, Marsilius does
not distinguish between the priesthood of the Catholic Church and that of Aristotle’s time,
because it is meant as a fulfilment of Aristotle’s philosophy.19 In this way, he grounds his work
not in the precarious discourse of his time, but on what he holds to be universal truths that
predate the papacy itself.
The third discourse is the shortest of the three in the Defensor Pacis, and consists of
fourty-two boiled down conclusions, distilled from the arguments in the first two, which Oakley
views as an ultimatum set for the reader.20 As his first conclusion, Marsilius reiterates that it is
necessary before considering the other points of his argument to believe as truth only “divine or
canonic scripture…and the interpretation of it that has been made by a common council of the
faithful.”21 If this disclaimer was not adopted by the reader, then his resulting claims would fall
on deaf ears. In the following conclusions, he comprehensively strips the Roman bishop of any
claims to coercive power, whether through the passage of decretals or the attainment of political
authority, and grants it instead to the human legislator or someone else by its authority.
Furthermore, he concludes that the Roman bishop has no power to manipulate the salvation of
any of the faithful, aside from what is granted them by scripture. The other topic that merits quite
a bit of Marsilius’ attention in his conclusions is the authority of a general council, which he
claims should be the legislative authority on matters that pertain to the church.22 Once finished
with his conclusions, Marsilius briefly explains the title of the work. It is presented as a guide to
preserving peace and tranquility in a civil community. The reader, whether prince or servant, is
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meant to understand by this treatise how to remove the singular cause of strife that prevents the
tranquility of Christian communities, thereby becoming a defender of the peace.23
That Marsilius’ treatise struck a chord in the discourse against papal authority is evident
by the reactions to it. That it particularly rankled Pope John XXII is expressed by the passage of
the bull Licet iuxta doctrinam in 1327, in which he condemned the author of Defensor Pacis. On
the other hand, it must have pleased Ludwig IV, who kept Marsilius close for the following years
as his vicar in spiritual matters.24 Though considerably censored in Catholic circles, Marsilius’
treatise was highly influential for those who would continue to break the yoke of papal power in
the following centuries. His contribution played a major radical role in shaping early modern
constitutionalism, and provided ideological support for the independence of the Italian City
Republics.25 Centuries later, Machiavelli would use familiar Marsilian terminology in the Prince,
lamenting the outside causes of strife that consistently plagued the City Republics of Italy,
maintaining that secular power must overcome ecclesiastical power for the sake of stability.26
Defensor pacis was a polarizing text, drawing enthusiastic support from some circles and
vehement condemnation in others. However, the focus of this thesis is not to address the ways in
which Marsilius changed the scene in which he was writing, but to analyze how it was used in an
entirely different dispute, over two centuries later and for a national hereditary monarch.
Two hundred years after Defensor pacis was released on the continent, Henry VIII of
England was in desperate need of a male heir, and was committed to divorcing his wife of two
decades, Catherine of Aragon, who had only managed to provide him a daughter. However,
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Henry had the pope against him, who would not sanction the divorce out of fear of repercussions
by Catherine’s uncle Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor. After years of attempting to placate
the pope, Henry decided to take matters into his own hands. He repudiated the pope’s authority
and declared himself the Supreme Head of the Church of England, freeing himself from the
shackles of marriage and the yoke of Rome in one fell swoop. Understandably, his actions were
met with staunch opposition from Catholics, both in England and abroad, and his ministers took
quick steps to justify this measure with polemical writings.
Enter William Marshall, who in 1533 presented himself to Thomas Cromwell as
translator of books ‘for the defacing of the Pope of Rome’. He was part of a popular propaganda
campaign led by Cromwell in which writers who were hostile to the Church were commissioned
by the government to justify Henry’s cause in print.27 Little is known of Marshall’s life, but we
can glean a couple of details regarding his religious leanings from his writings. That he translated
Valla’s De falso credita et ementita Constantini Donatione reflects a skepticism of the roots of
papal authority, just as A treatyse declarynge and showynge that images are not to be sufherd in
churches suggests an iconoclastic mindset. Finally, A prymer in Englysshe…for all people that
understande not the Laten tongue is replete with Lutheran language, which further illuminates
his religious leanings.28 Other than these texts, there is a scarcity of resources on the details of
Marshall’s life. Nevertheless, he received a loan from Cromwell of £12 to translate Defensor
pacis into English for the first time, which was published by Robert Dwyer in 1535.29
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With the stage set, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the ways in which Marsilius’
Defensor pacis was decontextualized and appropriated as an anti-papal polemical tool during the
English Reformation of the sixteenth century. The investigation that follows is fueled by a
couple of essential questions. For instance, in what ways does William Marshall tamper with the
original text? What conclusions can we draw from these discrepancies that inform us of the
realities of the Henrician regime, and how it differed from the scene in which Marsilius wrote?
How did Marshall’s translation fit into the surrounding discourse, both pro-Henry and pro-papal,
of the time? Finally, do the omissions and changes of Marshall’s translation do a disservice to
Marsilius’ original intent, or are they evidence of a translator who cleverly decontextualized a
work to fit into a different context?
To best answer these questions, this thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter
presents the findings of a comprehensive comparison of Marsilius’ work with Marshall’s 1535
translation. For the purposes of this thesis, a reading of the original Defensor pacis was not
possible, and instead the 2005 translation into English by Annabel Brett, entitled The Defender of
the Peace is used to best represent Marsilius’ true message and intent. Brett’s translation is used
for two reasons. First, it is the most recent translation of the work into English, and Brett’s
footnotes reflect her engagements with previous translations as she attempts to objectively
capture Marsilius’ true meaning in points of contention. Second, the level of scholarship of
Brett’s work, which is comprised of tireless references that not only reflect Brett’s understanding
of the historiography surrounding the original work, but also that of Aristotle, the Church
Fathers, and the world that Marsilius was writing in, makes her translation the authoritative
English representation of Defensor pacis. With this disclaimer in mind, the aim of the first
chapter is to describe the discrepancies that were found between the two texts, in an attempt to
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achieve a comprehensive understanding of the elements of Marsilius’ work that were deemed
either unnecessary or unacceptable for the religious and political climate of the English
Reformation.
The following chapters will take the insights from the first and analyze them as they
relate to different themes of the Henrician Reformation. The second chapter will present the
differences in Marshall’s translation that point toward the Royal Ecclesiastical Supremacy of
Henry VIII. While Marsilius’ text was essentially anti-papal, the political climate of Tudor
England was very different than that of the Holy Roman Empire in the fourteenth century, and
many of Marshall’s changes reflect this reality. The third chapter focuses on the religious scene
of England, and seeks to explain Marshall’s treatment of religious orders and traditional practices
and beliefs of medieval Catholicism that some began to criticize as superstitious. Finally, the
fourth chapter places Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis in its proper historical context,
bringing in other writings of Cromwell’s popular propaganda campaign, as well as the positions
of the English Catholic faithful in resolute opposition. Hopefully, through this discussion, the
realities of political writing at the time will be made clear. None of these writings were perfect,
but each reflect an astute ability to adapt to the pressures that were placed on them. Hopefully in
this thesis, a clear narrative will emerge that places many of Marsilius’ ideals into an unfamiliar
political climate, while rejecting the ones with which it cannot reconcile. Marshall’s world is not
one of honest scholarship, but of manipulating a preceding text to justify a contemporary cause.
But that does not make his translation any less significant from an historical perspective.

11

Chapter One
Comparison of Defensor pacis Translations: The Defense of Peace (1535) by William
Marshall and The Defender of the Peace (2005) by Annabel Brett
The First Discourse
Defensor pacis is separated into three discourses. The first discourse, which consists of
nineteen chapters, serves as the foundation for Marsilius’ political theory, which he continues to
refine and build on throughout the work. Drawing heavily from Aristotle’s Politics, along with
other works from the philosopher, the first few chapters of this discourse address the ways in
which civil communities are formed, the purposes that civil communities fulfil, the
categorization of essential offices in a city, etc. While these preliminary chapters are important
for medieval political scholars, they are better suited to the purpose of this thesis to simply
explain that Marsilius (with a highly Aristotelian influence) viewed the final cause (or purpose)
of the city as the protection of a tranquility of life for its members or inhabitants, so that the
members of the community “do not just live – which beasts or slaves do – but live well.”30 His
stated goal for this discourse is to “demonstrate what I intend by sure methods discovered by
human ingenuity, consisting of propositions that are self-evident,”31 in his overarching goal to
“expose only this singular cause of strife” (i.e. the abuse of papal authority) that threatens the
tranquility of civil communities.32 His subsequent arguments throughout the book consistently
point back to the ways in which they serve this final cause.
In the first eight chapters, there are no significant discrepancies between Marshall’s
translation and Brett’s. It is when Marsilius begins to explain his preferred method of protecting
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the tranquility of the civil community, in chapter nine and afterward of the first discourse, where
Marshall begins to take exception. Here, the discrepancies tend to revolve around the theme of a
correctly instituted monarchy, as chapter nine deals directly with the institution of the office of
prince or governor in a civil community. As a servant of the Holy Roman Emperor, Marsilius’
naturally opts for election as the best method of institution, because it better reflects the will of
the polity than oligarchy or hereditary monarchy. In the fourth section of chapter nine, a careful
reader begins to detect hints of the extent to which Marshall is willing to follow Marsilius. Here,
Marsilius presents the system of rule in Asia as an example of a tyrannical hereditary monarchy.
While Marshall is consistent with Brett’s translation that the presented system “is somewhat
Tyrannycal: because the lawes of it are not made vtterly or onely to the commune profyte, but all
togyther to the profyte of the kynge or gouernour,” he does not include that “inhabitants of that
part of the world endure a principate of this kind without grievance because of their barbarous
and servile nature.” 33 To include that specific assertion would perhaps draw an unwanted
conclusion toward the European subjects of hereditary monarchs.
For further evidence, one need not look further than the next section to find further
support of his unwillingness to subscribe to Marsilius’ opinion that election is the best way to
establish a prince. Marshall omits much the middle of section 1.9.5,34 where Marsilius accuses
any monarch who was not instituted by election as tyrannous if they rule over subjects whose
will is not represented. This lack of consent from the people, Marsilius asserts with the support
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of Aristotle, “separate[s] tempered and flawed principate.”35 Also present in this section is an
addition by Marshall, regarding the institution of a monarch outside of election. Where Marsilius
presents the attainment of other forms of monarchy in “due fashion” as less ideal alternatives to
election, Marshall inserts that such monarchs rule “rightfully.”36 With the insertion of this one
word, Marshall manages to mitigate Marsilius’ assertion that the only right way to best represent
the will of the polity is through election. The significance of this addition is made clear through
the rest of the chapter, as Marshall completely omits the last six sections of chapter nine. The
subject of Marshall’s omission is Marsilius’ defense of elected principates as the best possible
kind of monarchy. In these sections, Marsilius reiterates that “election can never fail, so long as
the human race does not,” and that “election is the superior mode [of instituting principates]
simply speaking.”37 Compounding Marshall’s attribution to other forms of monarchy as “right”
with his complete omission of the remaining parts of the chapter serve to completely change
Marsilius’ original meaning.
At this point, it is necessary to delve further into Marsilius’ theory of election, as he uses
it to establish the authority of the community in the decision-making process, and it serves as the
main point of contention between Brett’s translation of Defensor pacis and Marshall’s translation
of 1535. In chapter 12, Marsilius introduces the “primary and proper efficient cause of the law”
as the ‘human legislator,’ or “the people or the universal body of the citizens or else its
prevailing part.”38 These terms are used interchangeably throughout the work. As Brett explains
in her Introduction, Marsilius almost always qualifies ‘universal body of citizens’ with ‘or its
prevailing part (valientor pars)’, because “it would be unacceptable in the city to allow a few
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deformed natures to impede decisions for the common advantage,” and so “these must be
excluded.”39 This ‘prevailing part’ carries with it the legislative authority of the community as a
whole, as “it is not always easy or even possible for all persons to agree upon one opinion.”40
The logic behind this legislative authority is that all laws passed by the ‘human legislator’ will be
observed better by the community, “because any citizen will better observe a law that he seems
to have imposed on himself.”41 However, this theory does not necessarily mean that ‘majority
rules’ in the conventional sense of the term, as Marsilius not only stresses the numerical majority
in decision making but also the quality of the person. Basically, as Francis Oakley explains, “not
everyone’s vote is equal.”42
As Marsilius develops his theory of popular election in chapter 12, Marshall further
evades this electoral thread. In the following passage from 1.12.3, Brett’s translation reads:
And in consequence of this I say that laws and anything else instituted by election43 must
receive their necessary approval from the same primary authority and no other: whatever
may be the situation concerning various ceremonies or solemnities, which are not
required for the results of an election to stand but for their good standing, and even
without which the election would be no less valid. I say further that it is by the same
authority that laws and anything else instituted by election must receive any addition or
subtraction or even total overhaul, any interpretation and any suspension…
Here, as Marsilius follows Aristotle’s Politics closely to establish the authority of the ‘human
legislator’, Marshall mentions the same “pryncypall auctoryte” but leaves out any mention of
institution by election.44 Instead, he substitutes the ‘prevailing part’ of the universal multitude
with the ‘generall congregacyon parlyament’, which surely would have been a foreign term to
Marsilius, as he never mentions ‘parliament’ in his work. Another subversion of the authority of
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the human legislator occurs in section six of the same chapter, where Marshall omits Marsilius’
qualification that the ‘universal body of citizens’ alone or its prevailing part has the authority to
impose obedience to a law.45 Further, the final couple of sentences of the chapter are omitted by
Marshall, who concedes that the “approbacyon (approval), interpretacyon, [and] suspencyon of
the lawe” among other things belong to the authority of the “lawe maker or parlyament,” but
ignores that this primary authority is established by election.46 By inserting the anachronistic and
culturally specific ‘parlyament’ and omitting anything that argues for the sovereignty of the
people in communal decision-making, Marshall is able to secure a Henrician flavor to his
translation while diluting Marsilius’ original argument.
In chapter 14 of the same discourse, Marsilius explains the qualities or characteristics that
should belong to an ideal prince, to ascertain what kind of man should be instituted by election to
govern a civil community. It is important here to realize, as Marsilius explains in the following
chapter, that the duly elected prince is ceded the legislative authority of the human legislator by
proxy so that important decisions can be made more swiftly, but that the authority ultimately
remains in the hands of the ‘universal body of citizens or its prevailing part.’47 This will become
more evident in the discussion of chapter 15, but it is necessary to relate this now as it will ease
the understanding of Marshall’s omissions in chapter 14. In the beginning section, Marsilius
explains the previously stated purpose of this chapter, and sets it in direct opposition to section
1.11.5, which equates non-elected monarchy with tyranny. Here, Marshall reduces 1.14.1 into
just one sentence. He neglects to mention anything about election in this passage, nor to mention
the authority that would come of a man who was chosen by election. He seems content here only
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to focus on the characteristics that would make a good prince.48 Marshall then follows Marsilius’
elaboration in the following sections of the two virtues of the perfect future prince, which are
“prudence and moral virtue, especially justice.”49
The two translations next diverge in the eighth section, where Marsilius makes
specifications about the kind of armed force the prince should possess. He cites Aristotle’s
Politics again to claim that the prince “should have such a force that it is greater than that of
individuals, both of one and of more together, but smaller than that of the multitude.” Here,
Marsilius is obviously protecting the interest of the human legislator, so that the prince cannot
enforce his will over its authority, but Marshall omits any mention that the army should be
smaller than that of the multitude. He also omits the rest of the eighth section of this chapter, as
well as the ninth section, moving directly into the tenth and final section. Of the omitted material
is Marsilius’ assertion that the armed force not be granted to the prince until after his election, as
the possession of a force before any election would possibly influence the outcome. Again,
Marshall omits any mention of election.50 In this chapter, while Marshall is consistent with the
ideal virtues of a prince, he continues to avoid the importance placed on election while disabling
Marsilius’ theorized system that enables the human legislator to check the power of a prince who
betrays these virtues.
Marshall omits the first four sections and most of the fifth section of chapter 15, and he
even changes the title of the chapter to incorporate these changes. Brett’s chapter is entitled “On
the efficient cause of the best way of instituting a principate, which will also reveal the efficient
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cause of the other parts of the city,”51 while Marshall has “How yt prynce in a cōmunyte &
kyngdome is as the herte in a sensyble creature & ye without a kynge or prynce no cōmunytie or
kyngdome can stande & partly of a prynces duetye.”52 The main subject of these omitted sections
is a reiteration of Marsilius’ assertion that the prince’s authority is granted to him by the
legislator (or the prevailing part thereof) by means of election. A glaring omission takes place in
1.15.3, where Marsilius blatantly asserts that “an elected prince, and one without hereditary
succession, is given authority in the polity by a method that is without qualification superior to
the one involved in non-elected princes.”53 Marsilius also makes clear in 1.15.4 what was
mentioned above, that the elected prince basically serves as the legislator by proxy, “[f]or when
these individuals do something, the entire community does it: since those who exercise the
function of prince do it in accordance with the determination (sc. legal) of the community; and
because they are few or one in number, legal matters are more easily carried out.”54 In these
sections, Marsilius resolutely pits hereditary succession against elected monarchy, and throws
the theoretical weight of the authority of the ‘universal body of citizens’ behind the latter;
therefore Marshall has omitted them.
As Marshall’s modified title suggests, the remainder of chapter 15 consists of an
extended metaphor55 that compares the civil community and its parts to the body of an animal
and its parts. Marshall abruptly begins his chapter toward the end of 1.15.5 with the comparison
of the prince to the heart of an animal, because it “is fyrst fourmed” and “is more noble & more
perfyte in his qualytes & dysposycions, than al the other par¦tes of the sensyble creature.”56 Much
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like the function of the heart, “without the presence of the principate a civil community cannot
survive or at least not long survive.”57 Marshall’s translation is consistent in the extension of this
metaphor, which Marsilius uses to explain that just like the various parts of an animal, which
each function for the benefit of the whole, the various offices of the civil community should be
held by people who possess the appropriate virtues to perform their respective tasks, lest the
community fail. However, when speaking to the purposes of the respective parts, Marsilius
contends that “the determination or institution of the offices and parts of the city belongs to the
legislator, while the judgement, command and execution of that determination is a matter for the
prince in accordance to the law.” Where Brett’s translation has ‘legislator’, the corresponding
passage in Marshall’s translation qualifies it with “in ye parlyamēt assēbled by [the prince’s]
cōmaundement.”58 Further, while Marshall is consistent in 1.15.9 that the authority of passing
laws belongs to the universal multitude, he omits Marsilius’ further assertion that it also has the
authority to institute the prince.59 Taking these discrepancies into account, Marshall entirely
perverts Marsilius’ intended purpose for chapter 15. The metaphor of a civil community as the
body of an animal remains largely intact, but the qualifications that place the prince as an elected
official at the grace of the human legislator is entirely missing. Instead, Marshall places the
universal body of citizens in a bubble that corresponds to the structures of his own political
environment, and transplants the (unelected) monarch into the position of supreme authority.
Half of chapter 16 is missing from Marshall’s translation. As was the case with the
previous chapter, the nature of the omissions is evident in the chapter titles of Brett’s and
Marshall’s translations, respectively. The title of Brett’s chapter is: “Whether it is better for a
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polity to adopt a monarch by a new election each time, or to elect only one man together with his
entire posterity, which is usually called hereditary succession.”60 The title of Marshall’s chapter
16 is completely different: “That is most expedyent to the cōmune weale (commonwealth or
common will), to haue onely one certayne man to be prynce or gouernour, hym selfe with all his
posteryte whiche they call cōmunelye the successyon of kynred or blode.”61 As can be concluded
from the difference in the chapter titles, Marsilius aims to compare the two stated ways of
instituting a monarch, while Marshall fully sides with hereditary succession. The omissions in
Marshall’s translation entirely affirm this conclusion. Marsilius enumerates eleven reasons that a
community might opt for a hereditary monarchy followed by eleven rebuttals, one for each of
those reasons, that argue why an electoral monarchy would be better in each case. For instance,
in 1.16.1, Marsilius explains that a community might opt for a hereditary monarch “because a
monarch by hereditary succession will take more care of the commonwealth, as it is in some
sense his own and his inheritance.”62 However, he refutes this in 1.16.14, arguing that “a
monarch elected by a new election every time is more likely to do this, since it is agreed that he
will more often be a prudent and good man, as is clear by induction. For an election can always
adopt a virtuous man produced by succession, whereas the converse is not the case.”63 Marshall
has twisted Marsilius’ argument to assert the exact opposite. Marshall’s translation is consistent
with the eleven arguments for the hereditary monarchy, but he promptly ends the chapter there,
completely omitting sections 11 through 25. The result is that instead of weighing the advantages
of both kinds of monarchy and making a decision on the superior mode of institution, Marshall
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has only included the advantages of hereditary monarchy, all of which were disproven in favor of
electoral monarchy by Marsilius.
Marshall’s translation is consistent for all of the 17th chapter except for the final section,
which he completely omits. This chapter argues for the importance of a singular principate in
each community, and for the numerical unity of the primary offices of the city. Marsilius
explains that numerical unity in leadership is essential for various reasons, but most importantly
because a plurality of principates would obstruct justice, which would result in “fighting,
disintegration and ultimately the destruction of the city or realm.”64 Marshall seems not to have
any objection to this discussion on the unity of principates. However, he does not include any of
the thirteenth and final section, which references chapters 9, 12, 13 and 15 of the first discourse
to reiterate that “no individual person…nor any collective body has any principate or coercive
jurisdiction over anyone in this world unless that authority has been given to him or it directly by
the divine or human legislator.”65 Once again, Marshall picks the conclusions and arguments of
Marsilius that is relevant to his own purpose, while ignoring the foundation of election on which
they are founded.
Chapter 18 is a singular case of omission for this discourse, as Marshall omits the whole
chapter from his translation. Entitled “On bringing the prince to account, and for what reason,
how, and by whom he should be constrained if he transgresses the law,”66 Marshall instead
simply states “The. xviii. chapytre we haue lefte out all togyther as nothynge appertaynynge to
this realme of Englande.”67 At the beginning of the chapter, Marsilius admits that it is necessary
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to determine to whom or to what authority it belongs to judge princes with coercive power. He
goes on to extend the metaphor of the prince’s role in the community being similar to the heart of
an animal, as the prince is the ‘standard and measure of any civil act whatsoever.’ Therefore,
according to Marsilius, ideally the prince would never commit any act that required correction.
But since the prince is human, any action of his that requires correction should be judged
according to the law by the legislator, or by persons appointed by the legislator. He then
distinguishes between acts commited by the prince that are either serious or slight in nature. If
they are serious, then they must be judged according to the law, and if there is no law on the
matter, then in the way that the legislator sees fit. If they are slight and few in nature, then they
should be overlooked, as Aristotle claimed that ‘It is manifest, that legislators and princes must
be allowed a few misdeeds.’ However, if they are slight and common, then it should be defined
in law, and the prince should be corrected by the appropriate penalty.68 The fact that this chapter
is missing is entirely consistent with the other changes that Marshall makes throughout the first
discourse, and supports the conclusion that he was writing for a hereditary monarch who was
supreme, and had no intention of admitting any authority to the universal body of citizens over
which he was sovereign.
If Marshall’s discrepancies in the first discourse are viewed alone, they seem to
completely reject the authority Marsilius attributes to the ‘human legislator’, and perhaps has
even constructed a different meaning for the term. There is certainly no consideration for the
argument that an elected principate is superior to all other forms. But to take such a view would
beg the question: Why was Defensor pacis so important that Thomas Cromwell felt the need to
have it translated, even at the expense of gutting the political theory that serves as the foundation
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of the work? To answer this, we must shift our gaze to the second discourse, as Marsilius does in
the 19th and final chapter of discourse one. In this chapter, to which Marshall closely adheres,
Marsilius finally defines the causes of tranquility and intranquility in a city or realm. He makes
short work of these causes that were either already covered in previous chapters or referenced in
Aristotle’s Politics, before coming to his point. This chapter is really about a “certain unusual
cause of the intranquility or discord of cities or realms.” It is unusual because it is a phenomenon
that none of the classical philosophers could understand or predict, and it “hinders in a singular
way because of its custom of hiding its malignity.”69 Marsilius is referring to the claim for the
universal coercive jurisdiction (both spiritual and temporal) of Roman bishops, “which they
assert is due to them from the plenitude of power handed them (as they say) by Christ.”70
Marsilius’ aim for the rest of the work is to build on his conclusions in the first discourse by
bringing in testimony from the scriptures and church doctors to prove that no such coercive
jurisdiction belongs to the Roman bishop or to any other bishop for that matter. This rejection of
the temporal jurisdiction of the Roman bishops and the spiritual and political stranglehold that
they held over Christian princes, is the subject of the second discourse and the reason for
Marshall’s translation of the work. Therefore, he translates this chapter clearly.
The Second Discourse
The Second Discourse is Marsilius’ magnum opus, a full 30 chapters of anti-papal
polemic that argues against the ‘plenitude of power’ that medieval Roman bishops claimed to
hold over all of Christendom, supposedly giving them universal coercive jurisdiction over all
other principates. While the first discourse demonstrated methods “discovered by human
ingenuity,” Marsilius’ purpose in the second discourse is to demonstrate “testimonies of the truth
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founded upon eternity, and also with authoritative passages of the saints, its interpreters, and
other approved doctors of the Christian faith.”71 The second, as Francis Oakley puts it, would
have been the most popular of the three discourses during Marsilius’ lifetime.72 Interestingly,
Marsilius unfolds his argument in the opposite way of medieval papalist arguments. Where the
argument of papal apologists proceeded first through revelation (i.e. scripture, interpretation of
church doctors and saints, etc.) and then through human reasoning, Marsilius establishes his
argument first through reason and then through revelation.73 Because of this, Marsilius does not
include any theological reasoning until the second discourse. This would not have been lost on
his contemporaries, as he means to show that the correct institution of the church would not have
contradicted any of Aristotle’s writings, even though the philosopher could not have perceived
the historical events that precipitated the founding of the church. In this instance, Marsilius can
solidify his argument with Aristotle’s support because he would claim that the diversion of the
church from his works occurred through human perversion after the events of the New
Testament.
The size and complexity of the second discourse dictates that it is not convenient to
present the discrepancies of Marshall’s text in sequential order, as was done with the first
discourse. This was possible because the two themes of divergence (i.e. elected principates as the
best kind of monarchy and Marsilius’ establishment of the human legislator) largely
complemented each other, and because of the shorter size of the first discourse. This will not be
possible here, as such a sequential approach would necessarily make this chapter longer than it
already is. As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the goal here is not necessarily to explain the
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intricacies of Marsilius’ argument, which many historians have already attempted, but to present
the discrepancies of Marshall’s translation in a comprehensive and organized fashion. Therefore,
the omissions, additions, and other changes have been organized into groups, and we will
proceed thematically.
The first type of discrepancy that will be addressed in this discourse picks up where the
first left off. Marshall’s continued aversion of the human legislator is by far the discrepancy
committed the most throughout the book. There are four main methods that Marshall uses to
subvert the authority of the legislator, one of which often falls into the other three categories. The
first, and most common of these, is a complete omission of the human legislator and the
authority that Marsilius grants it. The first instance occurs in the eighth section of chapter five,
where Marsilius grants coercive authority to kings, dukes or other secular princes over priests,
who can be evildoers as much as non-priests. Since the punishment of evil transgressions is
reserved for secular rulers, priests should have no exemption from this, referencing Saint Peter in
I Peter 2:13-15 that ‘so’ (i.e. to obey princes and rulers) ‘is the will of God’. Marshall is
consistent that priests must be subject to secular judgment for breaking human laws, but he
completely omits Marsilius’ qualification in this section that these secular princes must be
established by the authority of the human legislator, as shown in chapter 15 of the first
discourse.74 It is important here to note that the reference back to a previous chapter is also
omitted by Marshall, because this is another of the methods that Marshall uses to subvert the
legislator’s authority, and becomes a consistent theme throughout the second discourse. Here, he
is covering his tracks well, as the part of chapter 15 that Marsilius refers to was omitted by
Marshall.
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Marshall further subverts the authority of the human legislator in chapter 10 of the second
discourse. In this chapter, Marsilius addresses where the authority lay to pass coercive judgment
over acts of heresy, which the tradition of the church claimed to belong to the priesthood.
Marsilius grants that “it belongs to a priest (i.e. a priest or bishop) to discern the crime of
heresy,” but maintains that the coercive judgment of heretics “belongs to the prince alone by the
authority of the human legislator.” Marshall omits that final qualification in this section, as well
as in sections three and six.75 In these sections, Marsilius is painting a scenario as to how the
priest and the prince can work together to judge a case of heresy while each staying in their lanes
according to the varying significations of ‘judge’ that he accords each of them. He basically says
that the priest is a judge of heresy in the first signification in that he is an expert on what things
are or are not considered heretical, much like a physician would be an expert on the subject of
whether or not a man is leprous. In this signification of judge, the authority on the topic has no
coercive power against the transgressor, but can make a definitive prognosis based on their
expertise. The prince, on the other hand, is a judge in the third signification. In this sense, he is
not expected to be an expert on what makes someone a heretic or not, but he should be an expert
on what sorts of things should be punishable by coercive judgement, which is his responsibility
and right to carry out, as given to him by the human legislator. Marshall here omits that the
prince owes his right to judge in this sense to the authority of the human legislator, and also
omits the part about the prince knowing about the law in the last and proper signification, which
carries with it some moral component to the law.76 Marshall commits this same kind of omission
two other times in 2.10.8 and 2.10.11, each time attributing the right of judgment in the third
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signification to the prince and neglecting to mention that he derives this authority from the
human legislator.
Other omissions of this kind take place further in the second discourse in chapter 25. In
2.25.7, Marsilius asserts that in the early church, the bishops both of Rome and other provinces
lived in the likeness of Christ and his apostles by submitting themselves to the coercive
jurisdiction of secular rulers. Marshall includes this assertion, but fails to mention Marsilius’
qualification that the prince held his office “by the authority of the human legislator.” He
commits this same kind of omission later in the section, where he also omits essential references
to chapters 12 and 13 of the first discourse and chapter 21 of the second, which eliminates the
evidence that Marsilius uses to trace the authority of the legislator.77 Further, in 2.25.8, Marshall
omits about half of this section from his translation, likely because it says that if any secular
prince had the power to institute a bishop or priest, it would only be because that authority was
given to him by the authority and will of the human legislator. It is not surprising that he omits
this, because all the references that Marsilius uses of previous chapters were either altered
heavily or omitted entirely.78 There is also a nod to conciliarism in this passage, which will be
addressed as a separate kind of discrepancy. Other examples occur in 2.25.8 and 2.25.9,
regarding exemption of the clergy from certain civil responsibilities and the investiture of
bishops and archbishops, respectively.79 In each instance, Marshall attributes a power to the
prince without including Marsilius’ constant disclaimer that he only has that authority by virtue
of the human legislator.
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The singular discrepancy of this category in chapter 26 follows the same theme. Section
five of chapter 26 points out that if the Bishop of Rome had the authority to establish the
Emperor (as papal arguments asserted), then the purpose of the seven electors of the Holy
Roman Emperor would be pointless. Marsilius claims that the Roman bishop deprives them of
their due authority. Most of this section corresponds between translations, but Marshall makes
some changes in the last couple of sentences. Marsilius gives the authority to the electors by the
consent of the human legislator, whose authority it ultimately is. However, Marshall omits the
part about the human legislator, and he also omits Marsilius’ reference back to chapters 12 and
13 of the first discourse.80 It is interesting that Marsilius connects his political theory to the
electors of the Holy Roman Empire, which ties into his entire discourse on the ‘prevailing part’
of the universal body of citizens, when in fact they constituted only a ‘tiny minority’ of the
empire that they represented.81 Nevertheless, it does reflect some notion of collective
sovereignty, which Marshall is keen to avoid.
In Chapter 28, Marshall omits the final sentence of section 26. Here, Marsilius writes that
Christ repeatedly mentioned how none of the apostles were over the others in priestly dignity,
and he argues that even if Christ had given that higher dignity to Peter, there is still no scriptural
basis that that dignity would pass on to another person after Peter’s death. This opens up for
Marsilius to reiterate his claim that that authority belongs to the human legislator or to a council
through human election, referencing chapters that help to prove that point. Marshall leaves out
Marsilius’ concluding sentence here.82
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Finally, Chapter 30 is where Marsilius brings the errant strands of his argument together,
applying his conclusions to the contemporary political climate and the rivalry between the Holy
Roman Empire and the Papacy. Two times in section four, Marshall omits a reference to the
human legislator, attributing its authority instead to the prince. In the second instance, instead of
omitting ‘human legislator’, Marshall omits the qualification of the prince being instituted in the
correct manner, which Marsilius would see as election by the universal body of citizens or its
prevailing part.83 The final sentence of 2.30.6 is omitted by Marshall, which mentions the
authority of the human legislator to correct the prince for overstepping human laws. Also omitted
here is a reference to Chapter 18 of the first discourse, which Marsilius uses in support of this
claim, and Marshall omitted in its entirety.84 The eighth and final section of Chapter 30 is
entirely omitted in Marshall’s translation, which is problematic because it serves as the
culmination of the first two discourses, weaving in the recently mentioned contemporary conflict
between Pope John XXII and Ludwig IV, Holy Roman Emperor and Duke of Bavaria, with
many of the conclusions that he references back to in previous chapters. It also seems to serve as
his ultimate reiteration of the authority of the human legislator, and the reader can certainly sense
the frustration with which he accuses the Roman bishops of assuming a power and authority that
simply does not belong to them.85 Marshall connects the last sentence of the second to last
paragraph of section seven with the final sentence of section eight, thereby cutting out the final
part of section seven and almost all of section eight from his translation, and effectively
decontextualizing Marsilius’ argument for a different audience.
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The second way in which Marshall undermines the human legislator is by substituting it
for another term, usually ‘prince’ or ‘governor’. The difference between this kind of discrepancy
and the one previously discussed is that the first mode actively omits Marsilius’ claim that the
prince derives his authority from the human legislator, while this method directly substitutes the
prince as that authority, where Marsilius made no mention of the prince. This first occurs in the
ninth section of chapter eight, where Marsilius explains that no person who enjoys conveniences
such as the protection of the human legislator in a civil community should be exempt from the
jurisdiction and decisions of that same legislator. Each time Marsilius mentions the legislator
here, Marshall substitutes ‘chief governor’ and ‘same governor’, respectively.86 Further in
Chapter 10, when Marsilius explains the authority to judge people in the third signification as
mentioned earlier, he confirms that this judgement must be “in accordance with the
determination of the human legislator or law.” Marshall simply has “accordynge to the
determinacyon of the lawe of man.” However, he adds a sentence that is not present in Brett’s
translation, claiming that “[a]ll these thynges (I say) belonge onely to the prynce & gouernour or
his deputie.” 87 This discrepancy is essentially a substitution, as Marshall omits ‘human
legislator’ and places the ‘prynce’ or ‘gouernour’ in its position of authority. Marshall remains
consistent in his method of substitution in the very next sentence, at the beginning of section
2.10.10. Where Marsilius mentions that Paul was judged in Acts 25 by a judge who was
“established for this purpose by the authority of the human legislator,” Marshall’s translation
reads “by the [authority] of the gouernour.”88 In each instance here, Marshall has not only
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omitted the authority of the legislator, but he has attributed its authority to a governor where
Marsilius did not intend to.
Marshall uses this method of substitution further in the second discourse to attribute
powers to individuals that Marsilius solely reserves for the legislator. In 2.15.7, Marsilius
explains that while the scripture confirms that all priests and bishops should be of equal status, it
is sometimes necessary for one bishop to be elected to ‘regulate’ the actions of the others. This
does not grant that bishop an elevated status, it rather places him a position of administrative
responsibility. However, in this position’s relation to coercive power, Marsilius maintains that it
is reserved for the mandate of the human legislator. Here, instead of ‘human legislator’, Marshall
simply substitutes ‘kynge’.89 Further, in 2.17.17, Marsilius affirms the practice in France of
managing the temporal goods of vacant ecclesiastical sees, concluding that “divine law does not
prohibit a legislator or prince from instituting and conferring or distributing [ecclesiastical
benefices],” but that in “perfected communities of the faithful this authority derives from the
concession of the legislator.” The first time ‘legislator or prince’ is mentioned, Marshall
substitutes ‘prynce or cheyfe gouernour’, and in the second instance he substitutes ‘legislator’ for
‘prynce or perlyament’.90 Present here is a clear swapping of terms that completely changes the
meaning of the sentence regarding where the authority lay in a kingdom to administer the
temporal goods of vacant episcopal sees.
In Chapter 23, Marsilius enumerates the various significations of the term ‘plenitude of
power’, and explains the ways that the papacy began to develop and use this claimed power
where there was no scriptural precedent for its existence. Explaining the development of this
argument for ‘plenitude of power’, Marsilius shows that certain ordinances of Roman bishops
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throughout the centuries were spontaneously accepted by the laity because of their pious
devotion. As these ordinances, which were initially papal requests, became embedded customs,
Marsilius claims that the Roman bishops began to impose them in the manner of commands.
They further enforced these ordinances “without any license from the human legislator” against
those who transgressed them “with the terror of vocal anathema or excommunication…all the
while under the appearance of piety or divine worship.” Here, Marsilius is clear that the fault lay
with the Roman bishops, who over the years exploited the ‘pious devotion’ of the laity. While
Marshall is consistent with this anti-papal train of thought, he substitutes ‘human legislator’ with
‘worldly princes’.91 He repeats this kind of substitution in 2.23.13, where Marsilius argues that
the adoption of the term ‘decretals’ for papal ordinances that carried with them the threat of some
penalty in the present world should be reserved for the power of human legislators.92 Marsilius
even claims in 2.25.16 that the pope and the clergy themselves are aware that the power to confer
the trappings that they enjoy rests with the human legislator, which Marshall substitutes with
‘prynces and theyr parlyaments.”93
Other substitutions reflect Marshall’s continued purpose to divert Marsilius’ authority of
the legislator, in 2.26.17, 2.27.12 and 2.29.1, respectively.94 In each instance, ‘human legislator’
is replaced with ‘prince’ or ‘parliaments’ to subvert Marsilius’ maintained conclusion about
which actual authority the Roman bishops have usurped. Therefore, by making these
substitutions, Marshall implants his own assertion that it was not the universal body of citizens
against whom the papacy transgressed, but the worldly princes.
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The third way that Marshall undermines the authority of the human legislator is the
trickiest mode to determine, because he actually translates the word correctly, as ‘legislator’ or
‘lawe maker’, but has omitted the necessary references or qualifications that Marsilius uses to
construct his meaning of the term. In some of these examples, the translations are entirely
consistent, which immediately raises a red flag for a careful reader, because there is almost
always a change of meaning involved whenever the human legislator is mentioned. For instance,
as Marsilius builds his metaphor of the priest and the physician as judges of their respective
fields in the first signification in 2.7.4, he reiterates that the physician practices the art of
medicine by the authority of a judge or the human legislator. Perhaps because of the triviality of
this qualification, Marshall translates it accurately, as ‘human lawe maker.’95 However, no other
mention of the human legislator to this point has escaped Marshall’s editorial pen, so why should
this one? Perhaps, he translates it in this instance as ‘human law maker’ because it simply does
not hold any substantial political authority. Or, he could have left the term in his translation here
to open it up to a wider interpretation. Nevertheless, since he almost always replaces ‘human
legislator’ with ‘prince’ or ‘governor’, or omits it entirely, its inclusion here cannot be traced
back to Marsilius’ original meaning for the term.
Every other instance that Marshall translates legislator correctly involves the addition of
‘prince’ to the power that Marsilius reserves for the human legislator alone. This serves as the
inverse of the first mode, in which Marshall omits that the prince derives his authority from the
legislator. This first occurs in 2.9.10, where Marsilius attributes the authority to institute a judge
of human laws to the human legislator, while Marshall simply adds ‘or prince’.96 This happens
three more times in Chapter 12, sections four, seven and ten, where Marshall adds ‘or prince’ to
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various specifications of the law that Marsilius says can only be permitted by the human
legislator.97 This mode is further used in 2.25.3, where Marsilius claims that the members of the
early church followed the ordinances of the Roman bishops out of necessity because the “human
legislator was at that time almost everywhere infidel,” to which Marshall adds “or prynces.”98
And again in the fifth section of the same chapter, Marshall qualifies the special favours that
were granted to the church by the human legislator after the time of Constantine with “or
prynces.”99 Each time that Marshall translates ‘human legislator’ consistently, he either does so
out of lack of apparent necessity or immediately inserts the prince as an equal partner in that
authority that Marsilius reserves solely for the legislator. Why he opted to add ‘or prince’ to
‘human legislator’ instead of merely substituting the two terms in the manner that was previously
discussed is unclear. Perhaps he did so because there was no possible way for the reader of his
translation to trace ‘human legislator’ back to the ‘universal body of citizens or its prevailing
part’, as he effectively avoided Marsilius’ construction of the term in the first discourse.
This brings us to the final mode that Marshall uses to undermine the authority of the
human legislator, in which he is consistent in translation, but omits references that point back to
that authority. As mentioned earlier, the omission of references is present in almost every mode
that has been discussed so far, but those instances always included a substitution or omission of
the human legislator. This example is more subtle, because Marshall is able to effectively make
the same conclusions as Marsilius while ignoring the reference on which they are founded. The
primary example of this occurs in 2.8.7, where Marsilius asserts that “any priest or bishop who is
a transgressor of the human law should have justice done to him and be constrained by the judge
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who has coercive power over transgressors of human law in this world.”100 Here, Marshall is
very consistent in translation when he calls the judge the “secular prince or governor,’ i.e. the
prince. The suspected reasoning for his consistent translation is because this is a rare occasion in
Brett’s translation thus far where Marsilius attributes this authority to the secular prince without
tracing his authority to the universal body of citizens. Perhaps Marsilius did not this find
necessary because he refers back to chapters 15 and 17 of the first discourse, which both
constantly assert that the prince or secular ruler owe their power to and should be instituted by
the human legislator. Marshall omitted considerable portions of both referenced chapters from
his translation, and omits Marsilius’ reference back to them in this section, as there would have
been no support to his claim here.
These examples that subvert the authority of the human legislator between the first and
second discourses are the most common type of discrepancy in Marshall’s 1535 translation of
Defensor pacis, and occur no less than 36 times in the second discourse. They change his
translation in a way that grants coercive jurisdiction on earth in all matters not to the priesthood
or the universal body of citizens, but to the unelected, hereditary monarch in each kingdom. Also
present are references to ‘parliament’ which is found nowhere in Brett’s translation, and could
only have been a weak contemporary concession to republican ideology along Marshall’s own
terms. However, there are many other kinds of discrepancies between translations, some that fall
into this theme, which must be explored.
As Marsilius develops the authority of the ‘human legislator’ in matters relating to human
law, he similarly constructs a ‘faithful human legislator’ as the ultimate authority in a community
that professes the Christian faith as a whole. In the same way that the ‘human legislator’ is made
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up of the ‘universal body of citizens or its prevailing part’, the ‘faithful legislator’ owes its
authority to the ‘universal body of believers’, and the position is conditionally filled by the
faithful prince. As Brett explains in her introduction, the historic event that mapped the faithful
legislator onto the human legislator was the Christianization of the Roman Empire under
Constantine the Great in the year 312.101 Tracing Marsilius’ political argument, the conversion of
Constantine changed the Roman Emperor from the ‘human legislator’ to the ‘faithful human
legislator’, and the Roman Empire from the ‘universal body of citizens’ to the ‘universal body of
the faithful. This plays directly into his purpose to argue that the papacy does not have any
temporal coercive jurisdiction, but are instead subject to the ‘faithful human legislator’, or the
Holy Roman Emperor as the rightful successor of Constantine’s legacy. This faithful human
legislator also best expresses its authority through the will of a council, as first demonstrated in
the Council of Nicaea (325 CE), which settled among other things the errant teachings of the
Alexandrian monk Arius.102 It is clear that Marsilius has tailored his political theory to
incorporate important historical events so that it appears that the natural course of history was for
this authority to fall to the Holy Roman Emperor.
As one would expect, Marshall often omits most of Marsilius’ references to the faithful
human legislator and all of the conciliar approach that idealizes the proper usage of this body of
authority. This first occurs in 2.5.3, with an examination of Paul’s command in Titus to ‘set
priests in every city.’ Marsilius points out that Paul conjugated the verb for ‘to set’ in the plural
form, indicating that he was speaking to all of the faithful, or else he would have used ‘set’ in the
singular.103 Marshall’s translation here omits Marsilius’ analysis of Paul’s conjugation of the
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verb, therefore undermining his assertion that it belongs to the universal body of believers to
institute priests. He does this again in sections 12 and 13 of chapter six, remaining consistent that
priests do not have the power to pass coercive judgement for any spiritual transgression, but
omitting the continued assertion that this authority belongs to the multitude of the faithful.104
Marshall even goes so far in section 13 to attribute this authority to a vague ‘hygher power’, but
gives no clue in this section what that higher power might be.105 Surely he leaves that authority
open for the reader to interpret as belonging to the prince.
This kind of discrepancy is most often committed in chapter 17 of the second discourse.
The purpose of this chapter is to define where the authority to institutes bishops and others
ministers of the church resides. Marshall’s translation is consistent in section seven, where
Marsilius argues that in times when the multitude of the community (human legislator) were few,
or if they were uneducated about what would make a good priest or bishop, or if there were only
one or two viable candidates, as was often the case in the early church, then it was okay for a
single priest or bishop, or a couple of them together, to institute another priest or bishop, in the
interest of the otherwise incapable multitude. However, Marshall comes to a different conclusion
in his interlinear gloss, praising the fact that at the time of writing, there were more Christian
princes who could make such a sound judgement.106 While this may have been true, Marshall’s
conclusion in the gloss attributes the authority to establish bishops directly to the prince without
the consent of the faithful legislator. Further in section eight, Marshall grants the power to
establish a bishop or priest to the prince based on the authority granted to him by the faithful
legislator, but omits Marsilius’ primary assertion that the multitude could make that decision
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through election without the necessary intervention from the prince. Instead, Marshall’s adds in
his gloss “[a]s it is [granted to the] most gracyous souerayne lorde [and] kynge by acte of
[parliament].”107
In the next section, regarding the establishment and promotion of ecclesiastical positions,
Marsilius maintains that the authority to do this belongs to the ‘multitude of the faithful’, or the
official elected by the authority of the legislator. Marshall, however, attributes this power to the
king or his deputies, or the chief highest governor, ignoring Marsilius’ stipulation that he is
handed that authority by the will of the legislator.108 But in the next sentence, where Marsilius
claims that he will demonstrate this assertion first from Holy Scripture, then with probable
reasoning, Marshall’s translation is not consistent. Instead, Marshall’s next sentence corresponds
with the first sentence of 2.17.15, meaning that Marshall omitted sections 10 through 14 of the
chapter. A brief description of the omitted chapters follows, to gain a better understanding of the
nature of Marshall’s omission.
In 2.17.10, Marsilius uses the account from Acts 6 to prove his assertion that the
ordination of new priests or bishops belongs to the multitude of the faithful. In this passage of
Acts, the ‘disciples’ (as the multitude of the faithful were called at that time, according to the
gloss) elected Steven and Philip to positions of authority. Here, Marsilius asserts that election
was used as a manner to institute bishops even at the time of the apostles, inferring that this
authority does not belong to the king or prince, unless granted by the legislator. In section 11,
Marsilius blatantly asserts that a group of the faithful should better be able to choose a bishop or
priest than any single person, because the more people there are, the more they should
collectively know what is best for them. And since the election of a good or bad priest could
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have a bearing on the status of salvation or damnation for so many people, it is therefore best for
the multitude of the faithful to elect the priest or bishop that would best represent their interests
in eternal matters.
Section 12 further supports the authority of the legislator to institute a priest or bishop
along the same terms as it has the authority to establish a prince. He justifies this by explaining
that even though a corrupt prince can cause detriment in the present world, a corrupt priest or
bishop can bring a more serious detriment, i.e. eternal death. Therefore, according to Marsilius, it
makes sense that the universal body of the faithful should work together to determine the best
viable option. Section 13 is only one sentence long, and merely references accounts from Saints
Gregory and Nicholas that serve as further testimony to Marsilius’ assertion. Section 14 is also
omitted from Marshall’s translation, which refutes any potential claim that a council of priests
could elect or institute a new priest just as well as the universal body of the faithful. Here,
Marsilius claims that “it cannot be inferred from this that the college of priests by itself has a
surer judgement of these matters than the whole multitude of which it is a part.” He says that the
judgement of the college of priests in the first signification (as experts on the matter) should be
enough to educate the multitude so that the multitude, which includes the college of priests,
should be able to make the best decision.109
Marshall covers his tracks well, as he leaves no trace of Marsilius’ argument for the
authority to approve or reject those persons who are to be promoted to ecclesiastical orders. After
all, these sections were full of claims that stripped the initial authority from the prince and gave it
to the faithful legislator. Marsilius begins section 15 building on the conclusion from these
sections that the prince receives his coercive authority from the legislator. Marshall picks back
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up his translation in the same vein, connecting the initial couple of sentences from section 9 (that
were fabricated to give the legislator’s authority to the prince) to the opening sentences of
section 15, which seemingly continue that thread, though he has left out pages of Marsilius’
argument without the slightest indication to the reader that he has done so.
As one would expect, following a section of considerable omissions, Marshall changes
quite a bit in the section directly after. Four times in section 15, Marshall substitutes the authority
of the legislator (faithful in this instance, as he distinguishes it at one point from the infidel
legislator) with that of the prince, and even adds the very English ‘parliament’ in one instance.
He also omits that these proofs are taken “both from Holy Scripture and from human reasoning,”
because none of that reasoning was included in previous sections.110 The very next section,
which deals with the responsible distribution of ecclesiastical benefices by the human legislator,
is also heavily changed. Marshall’s translation attributes the authority over ecclesiastical
benefices to the ‘kings and their most honorable and discrete counsels,’ before entirely omitting
the part about the human legislator responsibly dividing them. With this omission he not only
strips the legislator’s authority and gives it to the king, but also neglects to attribute the threat of
eternal damnation to one who does not distribute them responsibly. He then threads his invented
authority attributed to the king into Marsilius’ claim later in the section that they should provide
suitable food and clothing, which denotes a sense of charity and responsibility that replaces
Marsilius’ more urgent assertion. Again in this section, Marshall cuts and pastes sections that are
unsavory to his contemporary political climate, delicately papering over the cracks to make the
omission appear seamless and attributing a nonchalant domination of ecclesiastical benefices to
the monarch for whom he is writing.
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Marshall is also careful to omit anything that has to do with conciliarism, or the
convocation of general councils of priests or bishops as the prevailing part of the universal body
of believers. In Marsilius’ opinion, this method is the most proper manifestation of the faithful
legislator, as the council would be made up of judges of spiritual matters in the first signification
(as experts on the matter) and temporarily hold the coercive authority of judge in the third
signification, as ceded to them by the legislator. With this authority, the council would be able to
resolve all matters of concerning church ritual and divine worship, as well as make authoritative
interpretations of the disputed meanings of certain scriptures, in order to preserve the quiet and
tranquility of the body of the faithful.111 As he does with the human legislator and the faithful
legislator, Marshall largely omits any reference to conciliar ideology.
The first time that Marsilius mentions a general council is in the eighth and final section
of chapter 18. This entire section is omitted from Marshall’s translation, which is significant
because in Marsilius’ reckoning, this section actually deals with the meat of the issue that he is
trying to discuss. Marsilius actually uses this section to open up the discussion that the next few
chapters address. Of the things that he promises to talk about in this section, Marsilius first
establishes that it is necessary to put an end to doubtful senses and opinions of divine law, and
that the authority belongs to the human legislator to assemble a general council to resolve these
issues, using coercive power if necessary. He also promises to discuss how it only belongs to the
human legislator or the council instituted by its authority to establish other priests or bishops,
distribute temporal goods or benefices, or coerce any prince, province or community under pain
of interdict or excommunication, etc. None of these powers, according to Marsilius, belong to
any one bishop or priest. Finally, Marsilius says that it is necessary to institute a principal head
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bishop or church to provide guidance in spiritual matters, though to that person belongs no
coercive jurisdiction, or plenitude of power, or the power to change church doctrine, etc. These
powers instead are reserved for the general council of bishops or priests as instituted by the
legislator.112 Without this section, Marshall’s inclusion of this chapter serves only to
contextualize his thread of the historical dominance of the Roman Bishops. Since chapter 19
serves as another preliminary to the coming conclusions, and the following three chapters are
omitted by Marshall, it is understandable that he would omit this section entirely.
As just mentioned, chapter 19 also serves to set the stage for the discussion on general
councils in chapters 20 through 22, which are completely omitted by Marshall. Therefore, parts
of chapter 19 are also heavily doctored by Marshall to incorporate these omissions. He omits the
last couple of sentences of section one, which assert the necessity for a council to determine
matters of spiritual significance.113 The very next sentence in Marshall’s translation corresponds
with the first sentence of 2.19.4, indicating that Marshall has completely omitted sections two
and three. 2.19.2 points to the importance for Christians to believe holy scripture, especially the
things that were in doubt and that were settled through conciliar methods. 2.19.3 further pushes
that assertion, and of these sections carry the implication that interpretation of scripture that were
made outside of a council or that could not have been claimed to be universal carried with them
the risk of damnation. Therefore, while Marshall is able to pick back up along that thread, he
does so without mentioning Marsilius’ assertion that “the resolutions of general councils
concerning doubtful senses of Scripture derive the source of their truth from the holy spirit.”114
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This underrepresentation of general councils is further present in Marshall’s omission of
2.19.6, as it reiterates the authority of a general council regarding decisions over which scriptures
are canonical, which it receives from the legislator.115 An indication of the effect of these
omissions is present in section 10 of the same chapter. Where Brett’s translation reflects
Marsilius’ understanding that the employment of a general council is one of the defining
characteristics that makes the church ‘catholic’ or ‘universal’, Marshall makes changes to
completely flip that understanding. Brett’s translation focuses on the catholic church’s
interpretation of Christ’s sayings as authoritative, while Marshall references Paul that the gospel
is simply “the sayenge or reuelacyon of chryste,” and that “althoughe the holy churche had
preached any other gospell that is to say a contrary gospell, it shulde not haue ben true.”116
Present here is not only a subversion of Marsilius’ claim for the importance of a general council,
but also a systematic difference in belief regarding the interpretative authority of the church. It is
likely for this reason that he calls it the ‘holy churche’ instead of the ‘universal church’. This will
be further discussed in a separate chapter.
These changes were made so that there would be no loose ends to have to explain the
next glaring omission from Marshall. This brings us to chapters 20, 21 and 22 of the second
discourse, which were all three omitted in their entirety in Marshall’s translation. Each chapter
addresses various rights and authorities granted by the faithful legislator through the employment
of a general council, and Marshall leaves them out for the professed reason that they are “not of
moche value, and to auoyde the offence of some spyrytuall persons, that beare peper in theyr

115
116

Marshall, 95; Brett, 363.
Marshall, 95; Brett, 366.

43

noses, & [that] iudge euery truth to be spoken of malyce.”117 A brief description of these chapters
follows in order to better understand the content that Marshall does not feel necessary to include.
In chapter 20, Marsilius presents that it is necessary to define any doubtful meanings of
scripture, for the sake of the unity of the faith. He uses the heresy of Arius as an example of a
differing interpretation of scripture that necessitated an authoritative decision on what was right.
Marsilius claims that this authority belongs to a general council of Christians or their prevailing
part or those to whom this authority has been granted by the universal body of faithful
Christians. He asserts that those who have been selected by that authority should be at the
council, whether they want to or not. According to Marsilius, a council that is formed in this way
has the authority to define and ordain what is true regarding differing interpretations of scripture,
and that this is the way in which the apostles went about it. He then argues that this authority
should not pertain to the Roman bishop alone, or to his company of cardinals, on the chance that
a heretic is adopted to the Roman pontificate, along with the likelihood that his cardinals would
be complicit in his errors. Marsilius offers a contemporary example, citing Pope John XXII’s
1323 bull, Cum inter nonnullos, and Boniface VIII’s Unam Sanctam to assert that it is possible
for a pope to be a heretic.118 He closes this chapter by affirming that it is indeed appropriate that
the general council can consist of non-priests as well, because it was often the case in Marsilius’
time that priests had their position based on who they were or who they knew, and not
necessarily by any education or even literacy.119
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Chapter 21 begins with a few affirmations from Marsilius about what was said in the
previous chapter, culminating in the claim that if the emperor as the embodiment of the authority
of the faithful legislator has the power to call the council, then that authority does not belong to
the Roman bishop, and that it in fact belongs to the legislator to ordain the apostolic see. This,
according to Marsilius was once the practice, as the Roman bishop once urgently requested this
of the emperor. This evidence is used by Marsilius to reiterate the claim that the only licit way
for an individual to coerce anyone to a penalty in this present world is through the authority of
the human legislator or the prince to which it has deferred this authority. Marsilius further
concludes that any definitive decision of this general council of the faithful cannot be changed,
or added to by any authority except for another general council. Further, that it does not belong
to any bishop or priest, but rather to a general council or the universal body of the faithful to
make decisions on the dispensation of benefices and the appointing of ecclesiastical offices, in
order to put an end to simony. He claims that the Roman bishop handles these benefices and
secular principates (which he has usurped) in an illicit way so that he is able to stir up massive
sedition among Christendom. Marsilius then concludes the chapter with the assertion that it
belongs to the legislator to handle these temporal goods called benefices and to make sure that
the priests have enough to get by with, but not so much control over them that they are distracted
from their ministry by avarice and greed. Finally, he claims that many of the rights that the
bishops have claimed for themselves, such as granting licences to teach and the veneration and
canonization of saints can licitly be re-claimed by the faithful legislator, which initially conferred
these rights to the bishops in ancient times.
Chapter 22 is where Marsilius explores the ways in which there actually should be a
single bishop or college of priests as head or principal of the rest. He begins with a disclaimer
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that he must distinguish the different modes in which they can be understood to be the head of
the others, in ways that do not infringe on the authority of the legislator. Many of these have
already been discussed by Marsilius, and involve hypothetical situations in which primary
bishops can be understood to actually have temporal authority, most cases of which he denies.
He concludes these hypotheticals by claiming that no bishop or church can be principal or head
of the others by the authority of Scripture, but that one can be understood to be principal or head
by the authority of a general council or the faithful human legislator for certain situations, such
as an emergency of the faith. He likens this position to a church administrator, but with no actual
coercive authority, to where the said person can facilitate a smooth running of a council but
where the actual legislative authority ultimately belongs to the council itself. He goes on to claim
that the bishop that should be instituted in this manner should be the one with the greatest purity
of life and the highest achievement in holy learning. However, for several reasons, the fictitious
donation of Constantine being one of them, this position has gravitated to the Roman province.
He then reiterates that this was not in Constantine’s authority to donate this privilege in
perpetuity, but it would belong instead to the human legislator. Therefore, the only reason that
the Roman bishop acquired priority was through extended tradition, and the election of the
Roman bishop by the other churches and bishops has no scriptural basis. What has followed
since Constantine’s alleged donation was that the Roman bishops gradually extended their
authority, especially when the imperial seat was vacant and they were able to claim that vacant
imperial authority to the extent that it caused the sort of sedition among Christians against which
Marsilius is writing.120
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In the same way that he treats the ‘human legislator’ and ‘faithful legislator’, Marshall
omits almost every mention of general councils, effectively nullifying its meaning to a reader of
his translation. Marsilius often refers back to these chapters when making certain conclusions in
the second and third discourses. Many of these references, and their omission by Marshall, are
also counted here as subversions of the faithful human legislator. For instance, Marsilius asserts
in 2.23.4 that “[p]lenitude of power does not…belong to the Roman bishop or to any other priest
as such, unless perhaps they want to call ‘plenitude of power’ the priority or principality that we
demonstrated (in chapter 22 of this discourse) belongs to the above-mentioned bishop and his
church over all the others by the authority of the faithful human legislator.” Here, Marshall is
consistent with the assertion that the Roman bishop has no claim to a ‘plenitude of power’, but
omits the reference to chapter 22 (which was omitted entirely) and the power that Marsilius gives
the faithful legislator over the Roman bishop in that chapter.121 He does this again in the same
section, maintaining Marsilius’ conclusion that the seventh and eighth modes of ‘plenitude of
power’ do not belong to any bishop or priest, but omitting the references to chapters 20, 21 and
22 that Marsilius uses to prove that assertion.122
Though there are many other examples where Marsilius’ argument for general councils is
omitted from Marshall’s translation, these will have to suffice for the sake of brevity. It is
important to point out that there are also points where Marsilius does not mention general
councils or the faithful or human legislators, but there is an omission by Marshall of an electoral
claim. For instance, in 2.28.5, Marsilius considers the ways that others might consider Peter to be
superior to the other apostles, and Marshall omits that it could have been granted to him through
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human election.123 He also continues to omit references that would point back to electoral
authority, as he does by omitting a reference back to chapter 17 in 2.25.6.124 The constant use of
these methods, along with all of the evidence so far presented indicates that Marshall’s
translation has no room for any sovereignty that Marsilius grants to the universal body of citizens
or believers. Furthermore, he remains consistent in any assertion that strips authority from the
Roman bishop, but hesitates instead to grant the legislative authority of the church to anyone but
the prince, least of all a general council. Therefore, Marshall’s subversion of the legislator (both
human and faithful) can be found at all levels, not only through direct substitution or omission,
but by complete omissions of chapters and the references that point back to them. In doing this,
Marshall is able to dilute Marsilius’ overall intent by keeping the anti-papal opinions, but
striking all trace of anything that does not support a despotic centralized principate.
While all of the evidence just presented reflects an evasion of Marsilius’ political theory,
it is not the sole target of Marshall’s editorial pen. He also makes changes regarding any
attribution of powers or authority (or lack thereof) that Marsilius claims for the priesthood. This
is first evident in the last chapter of the first discourse, where Marsilius claims that there are
some people who should not be elected as princes, namely those who are already in the
priesthood. Marshall is consistent in translation for almost all of this chapter, but omits a quote
from Aristotle that the spiritual authority and the political authority remain separate, “[f]or those
are political responsibilities…[w]hereas these [i.e. the priesthood] are domestic.”125 However,
Marsilius claims in chapter nine of the second discourse that Christ and his apostles were judged
by the princes of the world, and how then could the priests their successors refuse to accept the
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jurisdiction of earthly princes and even claim to have power over them. He brings in this same
quote to show that Aristotle would have been of the same opinion, and while Marshall is
consistent with these conclusions, he actually omits the quote from Aristotle.126 In this instance,
while Marshall is quick to agree that members of the priesthood should not have any coercive
authority, he is less willing to concede that princes remain detached from spiritual matters.
This is further evident in chapter four, where Marsilius interprets the passage from
Matthew 17:23-26 in which Christ pays the ‘didrachm’ tax for both himself and Peter by having
Peter search the mouth of the first fish that he caught to encounter the money. While Marshall
includes the commentary of Ambrose and Bernard of Clairvaux that Christ’s payment of the tax
was his employment of the ‘render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’ principle, he neglects
to include Marsilius’ assertion that Origen’s interpretation is more consistent with scripture than
the others. Origen claimed that since Christ was a descendant of David, he was not necessarily
subject to this tax, but the fact that he paid it was an indication that Christ wanted to pay tributes
even if they were at certain places and times not due, “rather than contend about such things; and
to teach the apostle and his successors to pay them too.”127 Marshall’s omission here eliminates
any claim that Christ could have been exempted from paying the tax, focusing instead on the
contention that Christ’s payment for himself and Peter indicated that he subjected himself and his
followers to the secular authority. A couple of sections later in 2.4.13, Marsilius challenges both
political and spiritual authorities to “go ahead and dare to usurp the apostolic office as a lord, or
as an apostle to usurp dominion…you are clearly forbidden to do either,” for “if you want to
have both of these at the same time, you will lose both.” Interestingly, Marshall’s translation is
consistent here, but where Marsilius concludes that “dominion is forbidden to the apostles,”
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Marshall adds in his translation “so that they may not be lordes.”128 These examples indicate an
emphasis in Marshall’s translation that scripture denies any temporal jurisdiction to apostolic
successors, where he is less emphatic with Marsilius’ paired assertion that secular rulers should
not delve into spiritual matters.
Another matter that Marshall tends to evade is Marsilius’ attribution of a certain
‘character’ that is imprinted on the souls of ordained priests and serves to distinguish the
priesthood from other offices of the city. The omissions that relate to this are most notably found
in chapter 15 of the second discourse. Marshall omits the first section of the chapter, in which
Marsilius explains the problem that he wishes to solve regarding the institution of the priesthood.
While in other chapters, he explained that the human legislator was the active cause of the
institution of all civil offices, he also claimed that the priestly office of the new law was first
instituted by Christ alone.129 Marsilius introduces this ‘priestly character’ as the resolution to this
problem, which is therefore the reason for Marshall’s omission of the first section and the
beginning sentences of the second. The exact wording in Brett’s translation that is omitted from
Marshall’s is that “the priesthood denotes a certain disposition of the soul, which the learned
doctors of Holy Scripture call a ‘character.’”130 This is further explained in 2.15.4 to be the
“power of performing the sacrament of the eucharist or body and blood of Christ, and also the
power of binding or loosing men from their sins.” While Marshall maintains that these
sacraments belong to the power of the priest, he refuses in this case and in all others to refer to it
as the character that God imprints upon the soul of the priest.131 This occurs once again in
2.15.10, and notably in 2.16.13, where Marsilius claims that any bishop is indifferently the
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successor of any apostle, reasoning from Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians “And ye are Christ’s” the
meaning that “you are internally stamped by Christ.” In each case, while Marshall may admit
that the power or authority to administer the sacraments belongs to the priesthood, he refuses to
mention that it is because of an inherent character that is stamped onto the soul by God or Christ.
Also absent from Marshall’s translation are chapters 13 and 14 of the second discourse,
which discuss the status of supreme poverty and the rights extended to religious orders that
observe this kind of poverty. In his own words, “The. xiii. and. xiiii. chapytres ben omytted as
contaynynge no matter moche necessarye.”132 With the use of numerous scriptural references,
the thirteenth chapter discusses the differing modes of poverty, and presents all of Marsilius’
significations of right, possession, and dominion, etc. Marsilius goes further to explain that
Christ observed this kind of poverty, and commanded it of his apostles as well. This all seems to
be an attack on the riches and some of the claims from Pope John XXII.133 The fourteenth
chapter addresses some objections to the previous chapter, addressing first that this vow of
poverty, especially for priests and bishops, who must be provided for, does not mean that they
have to give what they have dominion over at the time to the first person who has need of it,
regardless of the situation. In this way, they can guard themselves against the uncertainties of the
future. He also shows that Christ and his apostles observed vows of poverty but still had
dominion over temporal things for their use. He then goes on to explain the various ways that
Christ observed poverty but still had dominion over certain things. The rest of the chapter goes
on to counter certain objections and this chapter also seems to take on the form of a
contemporary dispute between theologians and the papacy at the time.134 Recent scholarship
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suggests that these chapters were omitted by Marshall because of his Lutheran beliefs “as they
were an example of a mediation between God and man so odious to followers of Luther.”135
Although there are dozens of other changes in the second discourse of Marshall’s version,
they all fall largely under the categories that have been tirelessly enumerated in this chapter.
Most of them are omitted references to chapters or sections that, if traced, would reveal some
earlier omission regarding the human legislator or some other topic that Marshall did not find
appropriate for his translation. Hopefully, it has been proved here that Marshall did not have any
place for the human or faithful legislator in his work, but that this subject was not the sole nature
of his omissions. Also present is an unwillingness to represent Marsilius’ discussions on general
councils and monastic poverty as well as certain other characteristics that illustrated the medieval
understanding of the ordained priesthood.
The Third Discourse
Marsilius’ third discourse is the shortest of the three, and consists of forty-two boiled
down conclusions that he claims “follow of necessity from what was determined in the previous
discourse.”136 While Francis Oakley takes issue with Marsilius’ claim to have drawn these
conclusions directly from his argument in the second discourse,137 they are fairly comprehensive,
and Marshall gives them the same treatment as he did in the previous two discourses. For a
person who casually engages Marshall’s translation to gain a brief knowledge of how it diverts
from Marsilius, he would gain a prominent understanding of both Marsilius’ argument and the
parts that Marshall has no room for by reading this discourse.
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Perhaps the most telling discrepancies in the third discourse are the twelve conclusions
that are completely omitted, as they show exactly what Marshall has no room for. Remaining
consistent with the previous discourse, Marshall omits anything that has to do with Marsilius’
theory of election, any conciliar authority to interpret scripture, the rights granted to religious
persons under oaths of supreme poverty, etc. A couple of examples follow to prove this. In
Marsilius’ second conclusion, he establishes:
That only a general council of the faithful or its prevailing multitude or part should
determine the senses of divine law where there is doubt over the definition, especially
those matters which are called the articles of the Christian faith, and anything else that
must be believed of necessisty of salvation; and that no other partial collective body or
individual person, of whatever condition they may be, has the authority for the
determination just mentioned. The certainty of this is given in chapter 20 of the second
discourse, sections 4-13
Marshall omits this conclusion in its entirety, as he omitted everything in the second discourse
where Marsilius granted interpretative authority to general councils.138 He also omits the ninth
conclusion, that “elected principate, or any other office, depends solely upon the election of the
body that has the authority for it, and upon no other confirmation or approval,”139 and the
thirteenth, that “no one who exercises the office of prince…has plenitude of command or power
over the personal or civil acts of others without the decision of the mortal legislator.”140 He treats
monastic poverty in the same vein, omitting Marsilius’ thirty-eighth conclusion that “one whose
duty it is to observe the evangelical perfection of supreme poverty can have no immoveable
goods in his power without the specific intention of selling any such thing at the first
opportunity…etc.”141 Marshall does the same on eight other occasions, each time completely
omitting a conclusion with which he cannot reconcile.
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Just as telling a discrepancy is committed each time Marshall maintains a conclusion, but
substitutes ‘prince’ or ‘governor’ in the place of ‘human legislator’ or a similar term, which
completely twist the meanings of some of these conclusions. For instance, Marsilius claims in his
seventh conclusion that “the decretals or decrees of the Roman or any other pontiffs, laid
down…without the concession of the human legislator, oblige no one with temporal penalty or
punishment.” While Marshall is consistent that the Roman bishops have no coercive power, he
places the ‘prynces’ in the place of the human legislator, thereby maintaining his own claim that
the Roman bishops are not subject to any one prince, but to all who have the ability to coerce
them.142 Using this method of substitution, Marshall completely changes the meaning of the
sixth. While Marsilius in Brett’s translation claims that the universal body of citizens is the
human legislator, which is so important in almost every assertion that Marsilius makes, Marshall
changes this to the “prynce or his perlyament”. He also mentions the universal body of citizens
or its prevailing part, but relegates it to a place of secondary importance in the making of laws,
and only in places that such a method is used, i.e. not England.143 Marshall does this a total of
twenty-one times in the thirty of Marsilius’ conclusions that he retains in his translation. Of the
rights and powers that Marsilius grants for the human legislator, Marshall reserves most if not all
for the prince, including but not limited to: the authority to give dispensations to human laws,
coercive jurisdiction over all offices, including the clergy, the authority to legitimate bastards,
the authority to take ecclesiastical offices and benefices, to judge candidates for promotion to
ecclesiastical orders, etc. In each instance, where Marsilius takes these authorities from the hands
of the Roman bishop and gives them (theoretically) to the people, Marshall instead gives them to
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the king, making him the ultimate authority with supreme coercive jurisdiction in all matters,
both earthly and spiritual.
As he does repeatedly throughout the second discourse, Marshall also omits Marsilius’
references that point back to previous chapters as evidence for these conclusions. The vast
majority of these references are to chapters that were either heavily edited or entirely omitted by
Marshall, hence his omission here. Of the twenty-six references that occur too often to repeat
here, it is important to note that while many of them are part of an entire conclusion that was
omitted, some were the only part that was omitted in a conclusion. For instance, in Marsilius’
twenty-fourth conclusion, Marshall’s translation is consistent that no bishop has the authority to
institute notaries or other public officials, and he even keeps the preliminary reference to chapter
15 of the first discourse. But he omits other references to chapters 2, 3, 10 and 21 of the second
discourse that Marsilius uses as further evidence.144 By doing this, Marshall is able to keep the
actual material of a conclusion (or at least doctor it a bit, by substituting legislator for prince)
without having to trace it to the supporting evidence. If he did leave these references in, then a
diligent reader would have no trouble finding that much of that support is missing from
Marshall’s translation.
This brings us to the final and least common characteristic of the relationship between
Marsilius’ conclusions and those of Marshall’s translation: the conclusions that correspond
completely, at least in material. While they are few, these conclusions are useful because they
should tell us the points on which Marshall and Marsilius completely agree, in order to pinpoint
the exact reason that Marshall undertook this translation. The fourteenth conclusion is striking in
the sense that both the material and the references correspond with dead-on accuracy. In it,

144

Marshall, 138-9; Brett, 552.

55

Marshall is consistent that “no bishop or priest, as such, has any principate or coercive
jurisdiction over any clergyman or layperson, even if that person is a heretic.”145 That this is
accurately translated is unsurprising, because it serves as the answer to both Marshall’s and
Marsilius’ respective problems, i.e. the abuse of power of the Roman pontiffs. The seventeenth
conclusion is also translated consistently, that “all bishops are of equal authority directly through
Christ, and neither can it be persuaded according to divine law that there is any pre-eminence or
subordination amongst them in spiritual or in temporal things.”146 Other than an omitted
reference to chapter 14 of the second discourse, Marshall maintains in the thirty-ninth and
fortieth conclusions that bishops and other ministers of the gospel should be provided for with
what is necessary, but not with tithes or anything that is more than they need.147 The other couple
of conclusions that correspond between translations either fall into these same subjects, or have
already been mentioned. Therefore, it is evident that the point on which Marshall remains
entirely consistent with Marsilius is on the subject of priestly authority, and the ways in which
priests can best perform their duties as defined by scripture without devolving into corruption.
Looking at this work as a whole, it is easy to be swept away into small points of
contention and side channels to the extent that it blurs the intended purpose. This chapter has
attempted to keep the purposes of both authors in mind, while laying out the major discrepancies
which distinguish their works. It is important to remember that Marsilius of Padua was writing in
the fourteenth century for the Holy Roman Emperor, an elected official whose historical
relationship with the papacy was a volatile power struggle, as both claimed to fulfil the legacy of
the ancient Roman Empire. William Marshall wrote his translation almost two full centuries
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later, for a national hereditary monarch who had no use for Marsilian electoral political theories,
though nevertheless resented the extended reach of the papacy into his own affairs. This text,
therefore, should not be judged as an extremely dishonest translation of Marsilius’ work.
Marshall’s tireless omission of sections, chapters and references show that he knew exactly what
he was doing and exactly what to include to incorporate the religious and political realities of
Henry VIII’s England in the 1530s. Instead, Marshall’s translation should be judged and
analyzed in the ways that it decontextualized Marsilius’ arguments for an appropriate audience
as an addition to the surrounding discourse of a contemporary issue. The aim for the remaining
chapters of this thesis is to do just that: to examine the outside influences that dictated many of
these discrepancies, and to place his work in the proper context of the surrounding discourse.
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Chapter Two:
Marshall’s Translation and Henry VIII’s Royal Supremacy
Having described the various ways in which William Marshall considerably distorted
much of Marsilius’ intent in his 1535 translation of Defensor pacis, it is now necessary to
explain these alterations as they relate to the English Reformation. The aim of this and the
following chapters will be to assess the various themes and shifts of Henry VIII’s split from the
Catholic Church as they relate to Marshall’s translation, and to contextualize his work in the
surrounding discourse of anti-papal arguments. This, the second chapter will examine the
doctrine of Royal Supremacy that Henry VIII and his advisors developed throughout the 1530s,
in order to achieve a clear understanding of Marshall’s repeated subversion of Marsilius’ human
legislator. The subject of this endeavor has been notably addressed in a 1990 article by Shelley
Lockwood, entitled “Marsilius of Padua and the Case for the Royal Ecclesiastical Supremacy.”
While the aim of this chapter is not necessarily to disagree with any of Lockwood’s meticulously
researched assertions, it will instead use her article along with surrounding literature of the
Henrician Reformation to place Marshall’s translation as a defense of Henry VIII’s supremacy,
just as much as it denied the authority of the pope.
It is first necessary to discuss how Henry VIII and his counsellors constructed his Royal
Supremacy over the Church of England, to gain a better understanding as to why Marshall felt
the need to undermine Marsilius’ concept of popular sovereignty. While numerous biographies
of Henry VIII lay out his desperation for a male heir and his desire to end his marriage to
Catherine of Aragon, it will suffice the purposes of this thesis to explain that by 1532, Henry was
resolute in his drive to rid himself of a barren wife, and was in search of any theoretical

58

framework that would justify such a measure.148 While Pope Clement VII would have been a
distant figure to most Englishmen, he was at the time a captive of Charles V, the Holy Roman
Emperor and uncle of Catherine. According to J.J. Scarisbrick, the pope’s dependence on
Charles V at this time caused difficulties for Henry’s divorce campaign.149 Therefore, largely for
diplomatic reasons, Henry was not able to secure an annulment from the Pope for a marriage that
he claimed should never have taken place in the first place.150
He solved his problem by taking the matter of the divorce into his own hands, or rather,
into the hands of the people of England, over whom he claimed that he was sovereign both in
secular and religious matters. He justified this jurisdictional authority in all matters by appealing
to the notion of imperium merum.151 This was the medieval idea of ‘whole and entire monarchy’,
belonging to the Christian prince and usurped throughout history by the Roman bishops.152 One
can begin here to draw connections to Marsilius, as this idea was often the argument of
jurisdictional disputes between the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy. He distinctly covers this
in the twenty-sixth chapter of the second discourse, where he explains that some Roman
emperors after Constantine naively used Papal approval to solidify their rule among the Christian
faithful, and that the Roman bishops gradually abused this honor that was given to them to assert
their own dominance over the Emperors, even usurping their jurisdictional authority when the
imperial seat was vacant as a way of consolidating their own power.153 Almost the same
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argument is used to justify Henry’s break from Rome: “Rome’s pre-eminence had been the work
of ambitious, megalomaniac popes, exploiting accidental advantage of history and geography,
the disorders of past times, the weaknesses of other[s].” Furthermore, there was never any
evidence that Peter was ever in Rome, or that he enjoyed any primacy himself. Or if he did, it
would have been a personal attribute, a means of showing respect for his experience and age.154
These arguments, compiled by J.J. Scarisbrick, of Henrician propagandists were used to dispute
the Pope’s authority in any matters as a ‘historical accident’, and can also all be found within the
pages of Defensor pacis.155 Notably, Marshall included all of these arguments in his translation.
It is not clear from where Henry’s political theorists rooted their claims that England was
an empire. Scarisbrick acknowledges that the sources are vague on this subject, hearing only of
‘diverse sundry old authentic histories and chronicles’ which have ‘manifestly declared and
expressed that this realm of England is an empire’.156 Whatever the justification, it would have
been argued that this had always been the case, and that the acknowledgement of England as an
empire was merely the restoration of a long-lost right order, despite Scarisbrick’s assertion that it
was a “violent breach with several centuries of the immediate past.”157 These arguments
attempted to place England historically as an empire with a past full of examples of selfpreservation from papal reach, so that Henry’s theoreticians could further assert – as one
Henrician pamphleteer argued – that the bishops of Rome never actually had any authority in
England, and that English kings (as emperors) were also victims of the Roman usurpation of
imperial authority.158 Here, the words of Marsilius in Defensor pacis seem almost prophetic,
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when he points out the importance that the Roman bishops’ usurpation of the Roman principate
also affects other nations, because “once they have subjected this principate to themselves (so
they think) the way will be open for them easily to subjugate all other realms.”159 Therefore, by
appealing to the idea of imperium merum, Henry positioned himself as the inheritor of this
victimhood initially realized by the Holy Roman Emperors, the unjust nature of which it was his
natural duty to overthrow.
Henry’s claim to be the head of imperium merum made its most prominent entry into
English political discourse as early as 1533, when Parliament passed the Act in Restraint of
Appeals. The preamble to the act declared that ‘this Realme of Englonde is an Impire’.160 Its
body proclaimed England’s self-sufficiency in all jurisdictional matters, claiming ‘causes’ such
as Henry’s marriage suit to be under no jurisdictional authority but that of the sovereign national
state in which they took place, i.e. England.161 Henry now had his justification to complete his
divorce, which was confirmed by Thomas Cranmer on 23 May 1533.162 But that did not make
him the Supreme Head of the Church of England. The English legislature had defied the Pope’s
supremacy, but it had not placed Henry in the position of supreme authority. This was achieved
gradually through the passage of other acts of Parliament between the years 1533 and 1535. First
came the act of Conditional Restraint of Annates in 1533, which slashed the annual taxes that
were paid to Rome. Then the act for the Submission of the Clergy and the Heresy act, both
passed in 1534, effectively declared that the English clergy were no longer subject to Rome, and
made it no longer a crime of heresy to deny the papal primacy. Finally the act of Supremacy,
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passed later that year, declared Henry the unconditional head on earth of the English Church.163
This effectively cut all ties with Rome, and made Henry answerable to virtually no one in all
matters, both secular and spiritual, within his own realm.
With the development of Henry’s supremacy briefly explained, it remains now to show
how the intricacies and ambiguities of his unique authority made it necessary for William
Marshall to make so many changes in his translation of the work that was meant (at least in part)
to justify his actions. As Lockwood so concisely put the question, “why did Marshall choose a
work so apparently unsuited to his task?”164 To aid this investigation, we must first examine who
it was that made the production of this translation possible. While the king himself would surely
have been interested in the project, he doubtlessly had greater things on his mind than to interfere
in such a meticulous undertaking. That responsibility either fell to or was taken up by Thomas
Cromwell, Henry’s vice-regent in spirituals and vicar-general, who utilized the recent innovation
of the printing press to direct a governmental propaganda campaign to re-educate the English
people in support of the Supremacy.165 Reportedly, his willingness to finance Marshall’s
proposal to translate Defensor pacis into English resulted from his own admiration of Marsilius’
writing.166 However, Lockwood claims that there is no evidence that Cromwell instructed
Marshall on how exactly to translate the work, and it seems that Marshall was the one who
approached Cromwell with an offer to translate, rather than the other way around. 167
With this in mind, there was an ambiguity in the ways that Henry’s Supremacy was
characterized to justify the break with Rome. The King himself viewed his ecclesiastical and
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political authority in simple top-down terms, descending from God to himself and then further
downwards to the polity.168 This ideology was echoed by Stephen Gardiner, the bishop of
Winchester and author of De Vera Obedientia, who wrote that the Ecclesiastical Supremacy was
vested in the person of the king alone.169 Cromwell and other writers such as Christopher St
Germain, however, subscribed to the Marsilian idea that Henry’s Supremacy sprung upwards
from the authority of the polity, and was exercised through Parliamentary authority.170 While
Henry may not have directly subscribed to this idea of popular sovereignty, he certainly used it
to his advantage when it was convenient. For instance, in a circular letter distributed in 1535,
Henry asserted that the abolition of papal authority in England was justified “both upon most just
and virtuous foundations grounded upon the laws of almighty god and holy scripture…as by the
nobles and commons temporal of this our realm assembled in our high court of parliament and
by authority of the same.”171 What is unclear here is whether Henry actually viewed Parliament
as the source of this authority, or merely as a means of expression of popular consent for his
policies. Scarisbrick seems to hold that the latter was more accurate, and while the king and
Parliament seemed to cooperate easily on the surface, “there is a strong impression of a largely
unenthusiastic, conservative nation being manoeuvred into radical action.”172
This ambiguity in the source of the Royal Supremacy is reflected in Marshall’s
translation of Defensor pacis. Marshall makes concessions from both sides, while siding largely
with the king as the ultimate authority. On the one hand, there is no room for the Marsilian
argument that the prince be corrected by the authority of the community, as Marshall completely
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omits chapter eighteen of the first discourse. This chapter, which Marsilius uses to explain the
ways in which the prince can be brought to account, places the law of the community above the
king, and makes him subject to that law. For instance, Marsilius claims if the prince commits a
serious offense, that “[i]f it is defined by law, then he should be corrected according to the
law.”173 However, Marshall rejects the idea in his translation that the king be subject to a higher
authority, simply stating instead that this “chaptyre we haue lefte out all togyther as nothynge
appertaynynge to this realme of Englande.”174 He supplements this by making other omissions in
chapter 14 of the same discourse, leaving out Marsilius’ condition that the prince’s army should
be smaller than the whole community of citizens, so that they could resist the measures of a
prince who lapsed into tyranny.175 These omissions, compounded with the numerous occasions
in which Marshall equates the prince alone to Marsilius’ human legislator, reflect a tendency to
view Henry’s supremacy as answerable to no one except God alone.
On the other hand, there seem to be concessions to popular sovereignty in Marshall’s
translation, characterized by the unique addition of ‘parliament’ in lieu of mentioning the human
legislator. These additions are decidedly the most ‘English’ aspects of Marshall’s translation, and
seem to be an attempt by Marshall to maintain at least some sense of republican idealogy, or at
least to placate the arguments of Henrician theorists who viewed the king’s supremacy as vested
in Parliament. While they are littered throughout the first two discourses, this insertion of
‘parliament’ is noticeably prominent in its use to make a conclusion in the third discourse. In
Marshall’s fourth conclusion (Marsilius’ sixth), he says that only the “prynce or his perlyament”
are the “hymayne or worldly maker[s] of lawes.” But he does not equate parliament to the
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“whole…congregacyon of Cytezens,” which was Marsilius’ original conclusion, but instead
relegates the universal multitude’s authority to countries “where it is so vsed.”176 In other
conclusions where Marsilius has ‘human legislator’ or ‘universal body of citizens’ as the
supreme legislative authority, there is no substitution by Marshall with ‘parliament’, but a
complete delegation of that authority to the prince without qualification.177 Here there is a clear
discrepancy between the way that Marshall uses ‘parliament’ and the ways in which the
Henrician theorists of ascending supremacy (and Marsilius) viewed its role. In Marshall’s
translation, the English Parliament is not the source of Henry’s supremacy, but a tool in which he
can express his authority with the label of popular consent.
Therefore, the ambiguous and indecisive nature of the Royal Supremacy found its way
into Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis. It reflects a rejection of the main points of
Marsilius’ theory that the king derives his authority from the people, but provides weak
concessions to those theoreticians who saw the Supremacy best represented by the King-inParliament. It is best understood in the sense that it was a work of propaganda, whereby it
justified the absolute authority of the king by appealing to a conventional understanding of
popular consent. The authority that Marshall weaves into his use of the term ‘parliament’ is
nominal, just as Henry’s was when he used it to justify the abolition of the pope’s authority. It
was merely a convenient method of presenting Henry’s case as legitimately ordained by the
English people.
That Marshall’s work reflects the regime’s desire to portray the Royal Supremacy as
sanctioned by the English people begs the question: what did the English citizens actually think
about the break from Rome? While the following chapter will address the religious context of the
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English Reformation, it is important to realize as Ethan H. Shagan points out, that the actualizing
principle of the Reformation is that it was inherently political.178 The Royal Supremacy was
declared by acts of State, and the papal authority which Henry (and Marsilius) vehemently
opposed was a plenitude of both spiritual and political power, to which they claimed the Roman
bishops had no right. The fight for the divorce was a political issue, over which Henry claimed
(and Marsilius agrees in the nineteenth conclusion) the Roman bishop had no authority. Were the
people of England a largely conservative Catholic nation, who owed their allegiance to the Pope
over the King? Were they largely ‘Catholic’ though not necessarily ‘Papists’? Or did they openly
accept Henry’s supremacy, as he wished to show through his workings with Parliament?
Whichever category of loyalty different groups of English people fell into, the ability to
distinguish between the religious and political elements of Henry’s break with Rome would
inform the ways that they reacted to the Royal Supremacy.
There were a few who were unable to see the Reformation as anything other than a
religious upheaval, which threatened the very unity of the church. They saw the repudiation of
the Pope’s authority as potentially damning for the souls of those who went along with it. The
two most well-known cases of this unwillingness to accept the King’s supremacy were Thomas
More and John Fisher, both huge political and religious figures who were beheaded for refusing
to accept the validity of Henry’s divorce and for refusing to take the Oath of Succession.179
Another famous example was that of Elizabeth Barton, known as the Maid of Kent, who had
numerous visions that were critical of Henry’s divorce, including a vision that the king was
denied the sacrament from God himself while celebrating mass at Calais.180 She was duly hanged

178

Ethan H. Shagan, Popular Politics and the English Reformation, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29-32.
P. Marshall, 215; Shagan, 32.
180
Bernard, 89.
179

66

and beheaded, and her head was placed on London Bridge.181 Others, such as Reginald Pole, fled
the realm between 1534 and 1536 as an alternative to accepting the Royal Supremacy.182 While a
further investigation of Pole’s work along with others who argued for or against the Royal
Supremacy will follow in chapter four, it is important to realize here that some who saw the issue
as ultimately religious rather than political, and opted to flee rather than fall into heresy.
While the previously mentioned examples were high profile instances of resistance to the
royal supremacy, there were many of the common folk who felt similarly, and expressed their
grievances as the realities of the English Reformation crept into their daily lives. In some cases,
the potentially dramatic consequences for denial of the royal supremacy were matched by the
dramatic ways in which faithful ‘papists’ – to use the term that would have been applied to them
– defended the status quo. For example, in July 1535, when the articles on the royal supremacy
were read in front of the congregation of the parish church of Gisburn, one angry parishioner
‘came violently and took [the] book first of the priest’s hands and pulled it in pieces’.183
Furthermore in the same year, a man named Robert Augustyn said that he would regard anyone
who wrote intolerantly against the pope as ‘a schismatic, paynim, or Jew’.184 Again, a Scottish
Friar in Newark claimed that ‘[s]uch books as were made cum privilegio’ (with royal privilege),
such as Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis, ‘were heresies’, and that ‘if the king and his
council and my lord of Canterbury do that which is agreed by parliament and contrary to the holy
pope of Rome and the whole churche there, it is heresies’.185 These examples reflect the fact that
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there were those within the commonwealth who resisted the supremacy of the king, and perhaps
even threatened their own comfort and livelihoods by defending the papal primacy.
However, just as there were Englishmen who believed that they were defending the
Catholic faith by resisting the royal supremacy through word or deed, there were also those who
were able to reconcile their beliefs with the new order. Perhaps this was because they would
rather their heads remain attached to their bodies, but it could have stemmed from the ways in
which the English Church differed from the church on the continent. This is the conclusion
adopted by Peter Marshall, who attributes the relative lack of overt hostility of the English
Reformation to prove that the Pope held very little importance to English Catholics. He points
out that the clear majority of Englishmen would never have come close to the person of the pope,
and that he was hardly involved in the daily lives of the people other than enticing them to buy
indulgences, to conclude that within the realm of England, the pope “was, in every sense, a
distant figure.”186 This assertion is echoed by Shagan, who characterizes the English Church as
based in Catholic tradition and the community, but not necessarily in doctrine or papistry. He
concludes that most English Catholics valued a style of piety based in humanism rather than
obedience to Rome, and were therefore largely unaffected by the royal supremacy.187
These explanations are the attempts of historians to explain the inaction of the English
Catholic faithful toward the repudiation of papal authority. However, other than the
propagandists employed by Cromwell (who will be further discussed in chapter four), no
examples of the staunch defense of Henry’s supremacy jump out from the pages quite as well as
those who made daring expressions against it. Perhaps this is the nature of conformity, such that
those commoners who acquiesced to the authority that most threatens them are not as well
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remembered. The most attractive explanation for the lack of concentrated resistance among the
English public comes from Shagan, who reiterates that acceptance of the supremacy was the
result of a political process rather than a religious one. Evidence of this assertion comes from the
use of praemunire, rather than treason, as the charge with which the regime labeled people who
remained loyal to the pope. Praemunire refers to the allegiance to a foreign monarch, which
Shagan asserts was exactly what Henry VIII defined papism to be.188 This process, in which
Henry’s regime encouraged the development of the least ideological strand of medieval English
Catholicism while suppressing the less ecumenical strands, divided the Catholic faithful,
effectively crippling any possibility of a unified resistance against the supremacy.189 In simpler
terms, and with the evidence shared above as proof, it seems a necessary conclusion that this was
the way in which Henry was able to claim that his supremacy was ordained and approved by
popular consent. Admittedly, there were those who completely believed that the pope had no
jurisdictional authority over secular rulers, but the examples made of More, Fisher, and others
indicate that Henry’s regime suffered from anxiety that the body of citizens would not acquiesce
to the new order. Members of Parliament could be threatened, and opinionated citizens could be
coerced. Therefore, it seems likely that Marshall’s inclusion of ‘parliament’ in his translation is a
reflection of the Henrician regime’s empty appeal to a legitimacy approved by the people, when
it in fact it repressed any expression of popular opinion that was critical of the royal supremacy.
Another point of contention as it related to Henry’s supremacy was the authority of
General Councils of the church, references to which were almost completely omitted by
Marshall. At first glance, it is confusing to see why there would be no inclusion of General
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Councils in Marshall’s translation. Regarding the refutation of the authority of the pope, as
Lockwood explains, the doctrine of conciliarism contained a treasure-trove of anti-papal
propaganda, undermining the papal supremacy by appealing to episcopal equality and replacing
the Pope as the final place of appeal for ecclesiastical matters.190 This seems to be the mindset of
Henry VIII at first, who initially appealed to a General Council to resolve his marriage issues.191
The reason behind his push for a Council in 1534 was to use it as an alternative to the pope’s
authority, because scriptures showed that the pope had no authority than that of another bishop,
and because Christian princes had done themselves ‘to great injury’ by allowing it to continue.192
Here, we sense a concession from Henry toward the points that Marsilius makes in the twentieth
and twenty-first chapter of the second discourse, and in multiple of his final conclusions that not
only are all bishops of equal authority directly through Christ, but that many of the decisive
authorities that were claimed by the popes belonged instead to the determination of a General
Council.193 Many of Marsilius’ arguments regarding General Councils seem to favor Henry’s
cause, so why were almost all of them, with the exception of the equality of bishops, omitted
from Marshall’s translation?
The answer lies in the way that the nature of the authority of General Councils conflicted
with that of Henry VIII’s supremacy. Appealing to a General Council was useful in the
repudiation of the authority of the pope, but it would naturally submit Henry’s cause to the
determination of that Council. It was argued by Henry that the proper way to summon a general
council was in the way that the early councils were convened, by the authority of emperors,
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kings and princes.194 After all, the first General Council was convened not by the authority of the
Roman bishop, but by that of the Roman Emperor, Constantine. This was a point that Marsilius
made clear in the twenty-first chapter of the second discourse.195 That the authority to call a
General Council belongs to the ‘prynces and gouernours in the communytes of christen people’
is not disputed by Marshall, as it is the only one of Marsilius’ conclusions regarding General
Councils that he keeps in his translation.196 However, as Lockwood rightly points out, the point
of contention between the two translations, and between Henry’s supremacy and conciliarism, is
where the coercive authority lay. As has been vigorously shown in the previous chapter,
Marshall consistently substitutes the human legislator with the prince or governor, where
Marsilius derives the authority of one directly from the other. He does this clearly in the
conclusion just mentioned, leaving out Marsilius’ qualification that the prince derives this
authority from the faithful legislator. The effect is that in Marshall’s translation, Henry has the
power along with other Christian princes to summon a General Council, but is by no means
required to submit to any decision that is made by that Council. It is for this reason that Marshall
leaves out Marsilius’ discussion on conciliarism, because while it could prove helpful to reject
the supremacy of the pope, it would necessarily damage the king’s supremacy. That would make
a General Council the ultimate authority of the church, and as Lockwood explains, for Marshall,
“the only head of the church apart from Christ was the king in his own realm.”197
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the changes that Marshall makes in his
translation of Defensor pacis in the context of Henry VIII’s Royal Supremacy. Henry’s
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Supremacy was absolute, evolving from a fight against papal authority over his realm to placing
himself in that position of authority. While Marsilius would likely applaud the way in which
Henry broke away from the yoke of Rome, he would nevertheless be shocked in the way that his
work was misrepresented to justify Henry’s unchecked rule over the polity. While the will of the
people was weakly invoked by references to parliament, there is clear evidence of intimidation
aimed at the people at all levels of the social hierarchy who would oppose his break from the
church. This again prompts the question: why did Marshall choose a work to translate as
propaganda for Henry’s supremacy that required so many changes? The obvious answer is
because of its tireless rejection of papal authority. Lockwood posits that he used it to “satisfy his
own desire to see a Lutheran solution to the king’s ‘great matter’,”198 which could also explain
his omission of the authority of General Councils to interpret doubtful meanings of scripture. In
many cases, the jury is still out, as we will never know the exact reasons that motivated Marshall
to translate the work. It is easy to view his translation as a perversion of Marsilius’ intent, but he
does remarkably well to present the king’s case against papal authority in ways that would be
appropriate for the regime.
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Chapter Three
An Attack on Priestly Orders: The Religious Implications of Marshall’s Translation
To this point, we have examined Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis as it relates to
Henry VIII’s Royal Supremacy. Merely to stop there would be to view the nature of the English
Reformation as how many historians view it, as inherently political. While it is hard to ignore the
vast amount of evidence that supports this assertion, there is a case to be made that the
Henricians were also concerned with religious reform. There was, after all, a glaring problem
that faced Henry VIII and his councilors regarding the society of the priesthood, and the ways in
which it should continue now that it had been separated from its connection to Rome. While in
the second chapter, we largely agreed with Shelley Lockwood’s brilliantly researched argument
concerning the Royal Supremacy, she claims in one of her footnotes that it would be to overstate
the claim that Marshall’s omission of chapters thirteen and fourteen of Defensor pacis has any
direct connection to the dissolution of the monasteries that took place in the later half of the
1530s.199 Though she may have a point, this chapter will at least make an argument for that case,
as she otherwise fails to provide a detailed explanation of the reason for their omission, simply
citing that to include the chapters would concede a mediation between God and man that
Marshall’s Lutheran tendencies would not have tolerated. This chapter will examine the attitude
of Henrician reformers toward the medieval traditions and practices that characterized English
Christianity, to assess whether or not Marshall’s translation includes concessions toward reform.
His Lutheran beliefs have already been addressed, but this chapter will largely focus on the parts
that Marshall omits regarding the rights of bishops and priests, to see the ways in which these
omissions reflect the overall attitude of the regime toward the clergy.

199

Lockwood, 108, note 119.

73

First, we must understand the significance of Marsilius’ thirteenth and fourteenth
chapters. Though an explanation has already been made in the first chapter of this thesis, a
further clarification of Marsilius’ argument is necessary so that we may move forward with
precision. The subject of these chapters is the observation of meritorious poverty by religious
orders, which Marsilius claims to constitute a sense of ‘evangelical perfection’. He defines
meritorious poverty as a “virtue by which a person, for the sake of Christ, wills to be deprived of
and to lack all those temporal goods that people usually call ‘riches’.”200 It is meritorious in the
sense that it benefits the person who observes this kind of poverty, because it eliminates the vice
of avarice from the life of the observant, thereby freeing them to better serve Christ without the
opportunity for material gain.201 Here, we see Marsilius’ intent clearly as an attack on the avarice
of popes and other ecclesiastical authorities, who padded their pockets with income that they
gathered from pious believers. He goes further to explain that this was the express will of Christ,
whose observation of this kind of poverty was the definitive characteristic of his life that he lived
to perfection.202 Marsilius brings in copious amounts of scriptural references in support, to claim
that “it cannot be persuaded, on the basis of Holy Scripture, that Christ…had the said dominion
or possession of temporal things either as proper to himself or in common, even though some of
the saints are believed to have been of this opinion.”203 In this sense, Marsilius overwhelmingly
argues not only that the proper way to follow Christ is to observe meritorious poverty as he did,
but also that the authority of scripture overrules the interpretations of the saints.
He then opens the fourteenth chapter with a discussion on possible objections to the
previous one, primarily the concern that those who observe meritorious poverty must have food
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and clothes to for the basic necessities of life. Marsilius brings in the various significations of
‘dominion’ that he enumerated in the twelfth chapter to assert that it is possible to maintain this
kind of poverty while possessing certain essential items. He uses a passage from I Timothy 6204
in support, to assert that “those who receive the gospel (i.e. the laypeople) ought to daily supply
food and clothing to its preacher if they can.” However, he qualifies this by claiming that “none
of the faithful, according to Scripture, have any obligation to those who preach the gospel with
respect to anything else, be it a tenth or any part of their revenues.”205 Therefore, those who
practice meritorious poverty are allowed to possess food and clothing for the sake of sustenance,
but not anything that is superfluous, which could lead to the accumulation of riches and allow
avarice to creep into their lives. While there are other objections that Marsilius resolves, they
largely point back to this conclusion, that those who minister to the faithful ought to observe this
kind of poverty, so that they can perfectly evangelize to their flock.
With these two chapters briefly explained, they seem at first glance to be useful for
Marshall’s purposes. They are overwhelmingly based on scripture, and they reject the
accumulation of riches for popes and all other ecclesiastical persons. However, they imply a
certain status of ‘evangelical perfection’ toward those who claim to observe this kind of poverty,
and maintain the responsibility of the laity to take care of and allow the liberal existence of those
who adhere to it. The concept that Marsilius develops here is highly theoretical, and naturally no
religious orders in England were living according to the high standard that he places for the
clergy, though they would all claim that they observed it, due to the oaths of poverty that defined
the rules of various orders. But they would have used this status to claim exemptions from
secular interference. Furthermore, these chapters attacked the ecclesiastical elite, who amassed
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ridiculous amounts of wealth throughout the development of the Reformation. A discussion of
the religious scene in England at the time follows, so that we may divine clues as to why
Marshall left these chapters out of his translation.
When assessing the religious scene of England, it is necessary to first look at the way
Henry VIII viewed the existing traditions of the realm, and the lack of sympathy that he had for
religious orders. This is best examined by G.W. Bernard, who explains that the supremacy issue
was not the sole point of contention with Henry’s rift with Catholicism.206 Henry was
considerably influenced by Erasmus, and therefore believed that the church was desperately in
need of reform, even before the break from Rome.207 This is best characterized by a sense of
skepticism toward monastic orders as a whole, and the ways in which they enticed believers to
make offerings at shrines and embark on pilgrimages as expressions of their piety. That Henry
was skeptical of this traditional means of expressing one’s faith is evident in his relative lack of
pious spending. For instance, while going on pilgrimages was a common practice in England at
the time for those who were sick, there is no evidence that Henry ever went on one, nor intended
to when the sweating sickness spread through the country between 1516 and 1518.208 Likewise,
his charitable donations to religious institutions seem to have usually been made for the sake of
essential maintenance, with the odd exception of standard offerings of six shillings and eight
ducats to churches that he encountered in his path. This relative lack of pious spending stands in
stark contrast to that of his father, Henry VII, who provided for numerous religious projects out
of his own pocket. It was also dwarfed by the secular projects that Henry himself paid for, such
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as the elaborate palaces of Nonsuch, Whitehall and Hampton Court.209 All of this indicates that
even before the break with Rome, Henry VIII was less preoccupied with supporting the
intricacies of the traditional Catholic faith, and that he perhaps even regarded them as outdated
suspicion. This supports the conclusion from Shagan that prominent elements of medieval
Catholicism, “such as monasticism and many outward forms of ceremonial observance…were
inessential to traditional religion, as well as Bernard’s conclusion that Henry VIII’s
understanding of religion was not simply ‘Catholicism without the pope’, as many historians
have tried to characterize his Reformation.210 Instead, he was interested in reforming the parts of
the church that he believed were antiquated and that he and his advisors would relegate to mere
superstition.
This skepticism over the more traditional elements of the Catholic faith was mixed with
an overall concern for the state of the monastic orders in England. This topic was not new on the
scene, as the privileges of priests and monks, and whether they were justified, had been a regular
topic of debate for years before the break from Rome.211 The most well-known critic of
monasticism in Europe at the time was Erasmus, who was entirely unsympathetic toward priests,
regarding much of the tradition of the Church with skepticism.212 Henry was influenced by
Erasmus’ views, and he and his councilors viewed the monasteries as the centerpieces of the kind
of religion that Erasmus satirized.213 This mindset was echoed by Thomas Starkey (secretary to
Reginald Pole turned Henrician Reformer) who viewed monasteries as full of ‘ill-occupied’
inhabitants, and in need of ‘good reformation’.214 This also seemed to be the view of Cardinal
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Wolsey, who in the 1520s appointed deputies to investigate alleged corruption and slanderous
living in nunneries, and who even planned to visit the London Greyfriars himself, which shows a
strong belief for his cause.215 So there was a strong belief, at least in and around Henry’s
immediate circle, that something needed to be done about the monasteries, a belief which
stepped closer to actual reform than the break from Rome, and showed that there were actual
contentions over religious issues, and not just over the nature of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But,
before we discuss what was done about the monasteries in England, we must first briefly address
the actual modes of corruption and superstition that existed or were believed to have existed in
the monasteries that made them in such need of reform.
One of the main points of contention was the traditional religious encounters that can be
generally categorized as ‘superstition’. The practices that were believed to be superstitious were
largely the veneration of the holy relics of saints and the gaining of profit from pilgrims who
travelled to different monasteries to express their piety. For instance, the nuns at Grace Dieu in
Leicestershire revered the girdle and part of the tunic of St Francis, which was supposed to help
the lying-in period for women who had just given birth. Similarly, at Selby Priory, they claimed
that they had the belt of St Mary. Further, at Wetherall, Nunkeeling and Bridlington, each of
these monastic houses claimed to possess pieces of the true cross, and profited from the popular
expressions of piety toward these items by the gullible faithful.216 The most important pilgrimage
shrines were found in monasteries, such as at Haltemprice, where a pilgrimage to the grave of
Thomas Wake was believed to cure fever.217 At the Abbey of Hailes in Gloucestershire housed a
famous vial filled with the blood of Jesus Christ. Supposedly, the blood of Hailes was only
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visible to those pilgrims who were free from sin, so many pilgrims naturally travelled to Hailes
to determine whether they were with or without sin.218 Regardless of whether these items were
real or not, they provided much of the income for the maintenance of these religious houses.
Suffice it to say that within these orders, monks could technically observe their oaths of poverty
while the corporation of the monastic house itself padded its coffers, thereby ensuring a more
comfortable life for all of those within it. An observation of the ways in which the contemporary
priesthood fell short of the high standards set for them comes from John Skelton, who writes of
‘delinquent bishops, ignorant parish priests, worldly monks, gluttonous hypocrite friars,
determined to grasp for every penny’.219 Therefore to attack these shrines and relics with ridicule
and scorn was to strike at the livelihood of the monastic orders, who perhaps enjoyed more
comfort and wealth than their claims for ecclesiastical exemption justified.
Of the four evils that Dean Colet claimed blighted the Church – devilish pride, carnal
concupiscence, secular business and worldly covetousness220 – the last two could be viewed as
responsible for the ways in which the monasteries abused the donations of their pious
parishioners and pilgrims. However, the Henricians were also skeptical to the extent with which
the second evil crept into the lives of the members of religious orders. While an examination of
the actual findings of the visitations conducted by Henry’s commissioners will follow, it is
necessary here to explain that the extent to which religious persons violated their vows of
chastity was the topic of both debate and common jest. On the eve of the Reformation, as Peter
Marshall explains, the moral character of priests is hard to ascertain. Parish clergy in early
medieval times were often married, and reform efforts in the late eleventh and early twelfth
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centuries by Pope Gregory VII had little effect in the neighboring kingdoms of Wales and
Ireland. However, these efforts seem to have taken hold in England, and by the 1520s, there was
relatively little evidence of clerical fornication. In fact, Marshall concludes that a minimum of
twenty-five and a maximum of 102 priests out of 1,006 parishes were believed to be sexually
active, which suggest that well over 90 per cent of the clergy were maintaining their chastity.221
However, as far as the English laity were concerned, they strongly suspected the clergy to
be up to less good than they ought. While some expressed their concerns in a serious fashion,
others chose to express their criticisms in the form of witty jokes or rhymes, often at the expense
of the priests. For instance, Dean Colet lamented that priests in England hardly differed from
laymen ‘except for their tonsured hair and crown’.222 On the other hand, at least five editions of
the Canterbury Tales were produced between the years 1478 and 1526, and the ballads of Robin
Hood were also popular at the time.223 These publications would have proved fresh reminders of
many of the negative stereotypes of priests to the laity. Perhaps one of the more striking
criticisms comes from Thomas More himself, who proverbially claimed that if a good priest
preached, ‘a short tale will serve us…but let a lewd friar be taken with a wench, we will jest and
rail upon the whole order all the year after’.224 Therefore, while Peter Marshall claims that there
was not much evidence for widespread fornication among priests, there is clear evidence that the
beginning years of the reformation were saturated with commentary and speculation on how
many in the priesthood were falling short of their scriptural and societal expectations.
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With the general attitudes toward the perceived corruption of English monasticism
explained, we can now address what was done about the monasteries. While Scarisbrick refuses
to go into the depth that Peter Marshall and Bernard do to explain Henry’s action toward the
monasteries, he nevertheless asserts that “English monasticism was a huge problem…and that a
purge of the religious orders was probably regarded as the most obvious task of the new
regime.225 To that end, the decision to reform the monasteries was an expression of Henry’s
authority – granted to him by the Act of Supremacy – to ‘visit, redress, reform, correct, restrain,
and amend’ any problems or abuses within the Church of England.226 This opens up a point of
contention within the historiography of the English Reformation over whether the dissolution of
the monasteries was merely a financial ploy by the crown to usurp the funds of religious orders,
or whether it was indicative of actual reform. Scarisbrick is of the former opinion, along with the
combative scholarship of Christopher Haigh, and for this reason both authors exclude any
discussion of anticlericalism as it relates to religious reform.227 On the other side, G.W. Bernard
and Peter Marshall fly in the face of this historiographical trend, arguing that Erasmian criticisms
of monastic wealth were directly related to Henry’s action against the monasteries. For instance,
in his preface, Marshall explains that “it is an unapologetic assumption of what follows that the
conflicts of the Reformation were indeed principally about religion; that questions of the faith
were not merely a convenient covering for more fundamental or ‘real’ concerns about political
power, social domination or economic assets.”228 Bernard also rejects this historiographical trend
as too simple, arguing that Henry, as “has been insufficiently recognized…[was] committed to
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purifying reform,” and that “financial considerations were not the most significant factor.”229 In
the description of the dissolution of the monasteries that follows, this thesis will largely adhere to
the arguments of the latter two historians, primarily because it best serves our purpose to present
Marshall’s omissions from a mindset of reform, and also because Bernard and Peter Marshall
each explain the process to the fullest extent.
With this in mind, Henry VIII enforced his newly granted supremacy over the Church of
England, and his rights to visit, redress, reform, etc. that came with it, to order an exhaustive
visitation of the monastic orders, known as the Valor Ecclesiasticus. There had been precedent of
concern over the condition of the monasteries before the break from Rome, largely conducted by
Cardinal Wolsey, who was made papal legate in 1524 for the formal reason of reforming the
religious orders.230 Wolsey’s visitations were relatively tame, but were more concerted than
those of other pre-reformation bishops, and largely focused on the smaller religious houses.231
That the smaller houses were specifically targeted is evident from a papal bull in 1528 that
allowed Wolsey to combine any monasteries or nunneries that were worth fewer than 6,000
ducats, and had fewer than twelve inmates, a symbolic number that represented the twelve
apostles.232 Likely, the motivation behind this was the belief that any monastery that fell below
this number lacked the appropriate personnel to operate effectively, and that merging them with
another house would reduce the chance of corruption. Instead of pocketing the vacated revenues
of these monasteries, Henry allowed Wolsey and his deputies to reallocate funds from the
smaller monasteries to create and support colleges and universities.233 These measures were
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willingly endorsed by other bishops, such as Alcock of Ely, Fox of Winchester, and Fisher of
Rochester.234 Bernard concedes that the reallocation of money from nunneries to all-male
colleges and universities may be criticized as sexist from a modern feminist, that does not make
these visitations any less reforming in nature.235 It was under this recent context of previous
monastic reform that Henry’s commissioners began their visitations of the monasteries in the
mid-1530s, and it indicates that Henry was just as concerned with the state of the religious orders
in the previous decade.
As the Valor Ecclesiasticus got underway in January of 1535, the skepticism of religious
orders that was previously explained is evident in the kinds of questions that Henry and
Cromwell’s commissioners asked at each monastery. They asked no less than eighty-six
questions, that ranged from inquiring about the number of members in each house to whether the
monks slept in the same bed together.236 As Bernard explains, whether or not the commissioners
visited each monastery with the sole purpose of digging up the corruption that they expected to
find there, the reports that they made damaged the reputations of the monasteries even further.
What follows is a quick discussion on what Henry’s government reported from the Valor
Ecclesiasticus that tarnished the image of monastic life in England to a point from which it could
not return, and eventually led to their dissolution.
As Peter Marshall puts it, the visitations that were made by Henry’s commissioners can
be mined for eye-catching scandal.237 This perhaps is best realized by reports of how many
monks and nuns were breaking their vows of chastity. According to Bernard, it was not the
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reports of financial mismanagement that were so damning for the monasteries, but those of
sexual misconduct.238 His account provides the best researched compilation of these reports. In
some cases, the members of the orders would be implicated by the leadership. For instance, the
abbot of Wardon, who was frustrated with the undisciplined nature of his subordinates, would
complain that five of the monks were common drunkards, and had regular sexual relations with
boys or women.239 But this sexual promiscuity was not reserved to the regular members alone,
and in some cases, the abbots were worse than the rest. Apparently, the prior of Maiden Bradley
kept six children and even had a license from the pope to keep a whore.240 Again, the prior at
Shulbrede had seven women, and his monks four or five each.241 And so on.
The way that the commissioners reported their findings indicates that they fully expected
to find these things. For instance, when Richard Layton reported that in Yorkshire, the nuns were
taking abortifacients and the monks were practicing coitus interruptus, he included that he fully
expected to find the same kind of corruption at St Mary’s in York, where he was to visit next.242
This approach is also evident in the categories into which the commissioners listed offenders of
sexual misconduct in the Compendium Compertorum, the document which recorded the visitors’
findings for the dioceses of York, Coventry and Lichfield. Here, both P. Marshall and Bernard
agree that the category for ‘sodomy’ incorporated various other kinds of sexual offences to
further discredit the monastic orders. While at first glance, the act of sodomy appears to have
been a huge problem within the monasteries, Marshall notes that a marginal annotation shows
that out of the 184 cases of sodomy, 170 were sodomites per voluntaria polluciones
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(masturbation).243 Bernard reaches the same conclusion, admitting that where there are a couple
of cases of sodomy cum pueris (with boys), or passus sodomitica (someone who has submitted in
the act), the vast majority of the cases refer to per voluntaria polluciones.244 While masturbation
would certainly have been viewed as an unchaste act, it is curious that the commissioners seemed
eager to equate it with some of the more taboo sexual offences. After all, much of the criticisms
and jokes that were made at the expense of monks centered on their sexual promiscuity with
women or boys, rather than their individual actions. Is this evidence that the commissioners were
determined to make the sexual offences of monks and nuns seem worse than they actually were?
Was this an unbiased effort to present the findings in as honest a way as possible, showing no
partiality to different kinds of sexual offences? Or was it a carefully plotted measure that came
from the King himself and stemmed from his desire to get rid of the religious orders? Whatever
motivations drove the investigations of the commissioners, the evidence indicates that they fully
expected to find corruption within the religious houses, and their findings are presented in a way
that supports those efforts.
The other prominent theme in the visitor’s reports was the overall superstition that was
exploited by the monasteries, who abused phony relics to entice the laity into bolstering their
finances. While many in the religious orders may have believed that these relics were real and
actually carried powers to cure and otherwise influence the daily lives of those in the community,
the official stance of the government was that they were an outdated form of medieval
superstition. This seems to have been first brought to the King’s attention by Anne Boleyn,
toward the beginning of the summer progress of 1535.245 As has been noted, Henry VIII
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personally saw little value in expressions of piety toward the relics of saints or even toward the
power of pilgrimage. That the commissioners of the Valor Ecclesiasticus either inherently felt or
were instructed to feel the same way is evident in their reports. For instance, when Layton
confiscated a stone on which it was claimed Jesus was born from Maiden Bradley Priory in
Wiltshire, his skepticism was evident when he claimed that ‘belike there is in Bethlehem plenty
of stones and some quarry, and [they] maketh there mangers of stone’.246 The language of their
findings show further evidence for this skepticism, as they refer to powers that were supposed to
belong to certain items, and that articles of clothing were pretended to have belonged to certain
saints.247 Therefore, the investigations carried out by the commissioners contained little
sympathy for what they viewed as a money-making scheme in which the religious orders abused
the naivety of their parishioners.
Perhaps the most remarkable case of a bogus relic was uncovered at the Abbey of Hailes
in Gloucestershire. The Cistercian Abbey there was founded three centuries earlier, by Richard,
the Earl of Cornwall, the brother of Henry III. However, its fame came from the vial that was
believed to contain the blood of Christ, which was brought back from France in 1267 by
Richard’s son, Edmund.248 The abbey soon became a center of pilgrimage, as flocks of the
faithful travelled to Hailes to test the claim that the blood was only visible to those free from sin.
The money brought into the abbey by these pilgrims helped to maintain its existence through the
turbulence of the Wars of the Roses, and it was still a popular place of pilgrimage at the time of
Henry’s reign.249 However, while the abbey enjoyed great fame from its popular relic, it did not
escape criticisms throughout those years. None other than Thomas Aquinas was one of the first
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to doubt the relic’s veracity, as he claimed in his Summa Theologiae that relics such as these
could not possibly contain the actual blood that Christ spilled in his Passion.250 The matter was
the issue of a debate between three Franciscan and three Dominican monks before Pope Pius II,
who declined to pass judgment.251 It was singled out by Wyclif’s followers as particularly odious
and absurd, and one Lincolnshire man speculated that ‘[t]he blood of Hailes is but the blood of a
dog or a drake, and goeth by a vice, and all that liveth upon it shall go to the devil’.252 Suffice to
say that while the blood of Hailes enjoyed great fame throughout the centuries of its existence, it
was not without its skeptics, and was just as controversial as it was popular.
For some reason or other, the commissioners of the Valor Ecclesiasticus chose to make a
special example of the blood of Hailes, to expose it as a fraud and belief in its powers as mere
superstition. It seems that Anne Boleyn took special interest in the relic, as she ordered her own
chaplains to travel there to inspect it. Her appeals to the King reveal that they suspected it to be a
fake, and it was promptly removed from public view.253 Perhaps because of this special royal
interest, Henrician reformers chose Hailes as a test case for their attack on the ‘merchants’ and
‘jugglers’ of Rome.254 Present within the criticisms were highly theoretical theological
arguments. Hugh Latimer asked that if the actual blood of Christ was present in the consecrated
wine of mass, why did pilgrims make such a fuss to travel to see the same blood in a vial at
Hailes? William Tyndale asserted that the Christ who should be worshipped is the entire body of
Christ, who ‘sitteth on the right hand of the father’, whereas the blood of Hailes could only be (if

250

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, gen. ed. Thomas Gilby, 61 vols. (Cambridge, 1964-1981), part 3, question
54, article 3, in Shagan, 166.
251
Baddeley, ‘The Holy Blood of Hailes’, 278-9, in Shagan, 167.
252
Lichfield Record Office B/A/1/12, fol. 166v; Lincolnshire Archive Office Episcopal Register XX, fol. 61r., in
Shagan, 166-7.
253
Maria Dowling, ed., ‘William Latymer’s Cronickille of Anne Bulleyne’, Camden Miscellany XXX (1990), 60-1,
in P. Marshall, Heretics and Believers, 226.
254
Shagan, 169.

87

it were real) a portion of Christ, and not ‘animate with the soul of Christ’. This was to equate the
worship of the blood of Hailes with the sin of idolatry, which was echoed in a sermon by John
Hilsey at St Paul’s Cross in 1538.255 Nevertheless, the blood was inspected by Latimer, who sent
a letter to Cromwell that ‘it seemeth to be an unctuous gum and compound of many things…and
though it seemeth somewhat like blood while it is in the glass yet when any parcel of the same is
taken out it turneth to a yellowness and is cleaving like glue.’256 Therefore, the famous blood of
Hailes was denounced as a fake, and a public display was made so that the people there could see
for themselves, and condone by their presence, the government’s assertion that the blood enabled
idolatry.
This evidence presents a government that was committed to eradicating the English
church of corruption and superstition. Though a discussion of the full dissolution of the
monasteries may be useful, for the purposes of this thesis and for the sake of brevity it is
necessary to simply explain that Henry used the findings of the Valor Ecclesiasticus to justify
first the suppression of the smaller monasteries in the realm, as they were reportedly the most
corrupt.257 A draft bill in 1535 reflects the concerns of the commissioners, as it would “ban
monks from alluring or seducing anyone into coming on pilgrimage, from giving ‘any peculiar
office to any saint’, and from setting forth any images or relics for lucre.”258 Many of the smaller
monasteries were absolved, though there were some who obtained exemptions from Henry VIII
to continue their operations, and others were absorbed into larger religious houses.259 Henry
would follow with the dissolution of the larger houses toward the end of the decade and the
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beginning of the 1540s, after the Pilgrimage of Grace rebellion, during which Henry was to
equate monastic influence with unrest and sedition.260 However, Bernard claims that the
dissolution of the smaller monasteries was not an indication of Henry’s desire to eventually rid
the country of monasticism. Rather, the tendency to grant exemptions and transfers from the
smaller monasteries indicate that he was actually interested in reform.261 Bernard’s argument is
compelling, and while it is not without its critics, it presents Henry as a religious reformer once
the matter of his Supremacy had been solidified.
How does this tie in with William Marshall? Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis was
not published until 1535, which predates the dissolution of the monasteries. In this sense,
Lockwood is right that his omission of the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of the second
discourse are not directly connected to the dissolution of the monasteries. However, I am arguing
that the main reason behind the dissolution of the monasteries was the general sense of
skepticism and over monastic orders as a whole, and that Marshall omitted these chapters out of
the same feeling of skepticism. While there is nothing in the chapters that deal with relics and
monastic celibacy, I believe that Marsilius raises objections to the riches of certain bishops and
popes, while maintaining a sympathetic attitude toward and reserving right for monasticism as a
whole. Further evidence of Marshall’s possible skepticism comes from his complete omission of
Marsilius’ claim that the priesthood is set apart from the other offices of the city because it
“denotes a certain disposition of the soul, which the learned doctors of Holy Scripture call a
‘character’.”262 This priestly character could only refer to the sacrament of ordination, after
which the priest becomes a walking icon of Christ. Because of a priest’s sacramental character
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given to him through ordination, Peter Marshall asserts that the mass of an immoral priest was as
valid as that of a living saint.263 By leaving out any reference to this character, Marshall affirms
his skepticism of the corruption of priests. Therefore, the evidence presented in this chapter is
used not to argue with Lockwood’s claim, but to amend it. Marshall’s omission of these chapters
and certain discussions regarding priests may have no direct connection to the dissolution of the
monasteries, but it is indicative of the skepticism that called for reform of the religious orders,
and suggests that Marshall’s translation concerns itself with more than just the conflict over the
supremacy of the Church.
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Chapter Four
Placing Marshall’s Translation in Context
With the previous two points resolved over Marshall’s translation as it relates to the
Royal Supremacy and religious reform, it now remains to place his work in its proper context. As
previously mentioned in Chapter Two, this work should not be valued as an honest translation of
Defensor pacis, but in the way that it used Marsilius’ work to provide an answer for a
contemporary issue. In the sense that it was an attack against the abuses of the power of the
papacy, it was but a cog in the surrounding discourse of the Henrician Reformation, which
consisted of arguments that hinged on the privileges of the Roman bishops in relation to secular
monarchs. These arguments focused heavily on the interpretation of scripture as well as the longstanding tradition of the Catholic Church, and the emphasis that each author placed on either one
of these justifications is indicative of their motives. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is
to explain the writings that emerged in the 1530s that both justified and condemned Henry’s
break from Rome, to provide a better understanding of how Marshall’s translation of Defensor
pacis would have been understood.
As has briefly been explained, Marshall’s translation was no mere convenience to the
Henrician regime as a text that had already been translated and was modified to fit the political
structures of Tudor England. Instead, it was a concerted effort to bring an already existing text
into the English public discourse as a justification for Henry’s cause. It was part of a popular
propaganda campaign, envisioned by Thomas Cromwell, made up of texts by a group of radical
humanists who also harbored Lutheran sympathies. These works supplemented the immediately
previous works by prominent clergymen, notably Richard Sampson, Edward Foxe, and Stephen
Gardiner, who each wrote original tracts that argued against the papal supremacy. What is
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interesting to note here is that while Cromwell was the patron of these works, each of the
propagandists took the initiative to volunteer their services rather than the other way around,
which provides an insight into their hostility to the Church and their willingness to throw their lot
in with Henry’s dilemma.264 Nevertheless, the support that Marshall’s text along with those of
the other propagandists received from the government stands in stark contrast to the arguments
for the opposition. Of those opposed, John Fisher, Thomas More and Reginald Pole stand at the
forefront, and while Fisher and More were imprisoned and eventually executed for their efforts,
Pole was only able to present his efforts from the safety of the continent. Therefore, the majority
of the texts addressed in this chapter were used in support for Henry’s case, as they were openly
published without threat of censorship or imprisonment. The writings for the opposition are less
prominent, as they would have been repressed if published in England, though Pole’s De unitate
provides a significant example that proved to be a constant annoyance to Henry VIII.
In the first half of the 1530s, as the Succession Act and the Act of Submission of the
Clergy polarized the population over the issue of the King’s supremacy and the legitimacy of his
second marriage, Cromwell engineered a propaganda campaign that would flood the country
with anti-papal literature. While in the 1520s, Henry was largely preoccupied with securing
papal approval to carry out his divorce, it seems that by the turn of the decade, the efforts of the
Henry and his ministers were focused less on justifying the divorce to the pope, and had decided
that a break from Rome was necessary to accomplish their goal. This is evident in the trip that
Cromwell’s servant, Stephen Vaughan, took to Flanders in 1530-31. While his professed mission
was to convince William Tyndale to return to England, Michael Everett presents evidence that
Vaughan was also under instructions to keep his eyes open for any other anti-papal works that
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were circulating through the area, and to report any religious radicals whose services may prove
useful in providing support for the king’s ‘great matter’.265 Another point that supports this
assertion is the fact that in the first phase of Cromwell’s propaganda campaign, the arguments
that he enlisted were directed against canon law, and the emphasis that it placed on the
jurisdictional authority of popes, rather than attempt to further justify Henry’s divorce. As
Quentin Skinner points out, this was a considerable coup for Cromwell and the King, because
this first wave of propaganda used established religious figures and canon lawyers to justify
Henry VIII’s supremacy according to canon law.266 It is the writings of these religious persons
that we will first address.
Though there were nearly fifty books that were published in the 1530s to justify Henry’s
break from Rome, it will best suit our purposes to focus on the most significant ones. In the first
wave of Cromwell’s campaign, the prominent figures who wrote in support of the King were
Richard Sampson, Edward Foxe and Stephen Gardiner. It was just stated that their defenses of
the King’s Supremacy were valued because of their occupations, and would have been presented
as re-interpretations of canon law by persons of ecclesiastical authority who were not necessarily
known as radical. However, it is important to realize that in this first phase, these authors did not
exactly write their defenses because of any sincere compulsion that Henry VIII’s case was right.
Rather, there were personal motives. For instance, both Foxe and Sampson seemed to have taken
up their tasks with the promise of a promotion, and each of them were duly given bishoprics in
Hereford and Chichester, respectively, once their works were finished.267 Gardiner, bishop of
Winchester, was rumored to have only agreed to write against the papacy after he was threatened
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with imprisonment and death. The King had already found reason not to trust Gardiner who,
when Parliament passed the Supplication of the Ordinaries in 1532, drafted convocation’s initial
response that reflected no intention from the ecclesiastical elite to yield any of their customs or
practices that preyed on the laity. Interestingly, Everett asserts that it was Gardiner’s fall from
grace during this episode that initiated the rise of Cromwell into Henry’s good graces.268 That
Henry VIII was suspicious of what he called Gardiner’s ‘coloured doubleness’ was justified after
the deaths of the King and his son Edward VI, when Gardiner did homage to Mary, and even
became Lord Chancellor in 1553 during the Catholic revival.269 Therefore, it is important to
realize that these people were used by Cromwell not because of any affinity for Henry’s break
from Rome, but because of their knowledge of canon law, which Cromwell hoped to manipulate
to reflect the King’s desires.
The first to publish his defense of the Royal Supremacy was Richard Sampson, who
issued his Oratio qua Docet Anglos Regiae Dignitati ut Obediant (oration teaching the English
obedience to the kingly dignity) in 1534. Of the three, Sampson’s tract was the shortest, and
consisted of what Glenn Burgess claims was “little more than a set of bald assertions.”270
However, this may have been because it was at the forefront of the discourse around the
relatively un-theorized concept of the Royal Supremacy. Burgess as well as Andrew Chibi offer
this as an explanation for the simplicity and caution of Sampson’s arguments. Chibi claims that
since Sampson was writing before the actual rights and powers that were vested in the Royal
Supremacy were worked out, he did little to distinguish ‘royal’ from ‘papal’ authority.271 A
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discussion of that distinction would later come in Foxe’s writing, but Sampson’s Oration simply
dealt with the authority of a king within his own realm. In his argument, the pope had no
authority extra provinciam (outside of his own kingdom) meaning that he had no more power in
England than the archbishop of Canterbury had in Rome.272 It was Sampson’s early effort that
Reginald Pole was to attack so vehemently, hurling insult after insult at his intelligence and using
Church tradition as the main point of attack at his general defense of the King’s Supremacy.
The next to publish was Edward Foxe, whose De Vera Differentia Regiae Potestatis et
Ecclesiasticae (on the true difference between regal and ecclesiastical power) was finished later
in the same year. As the title suggests, Foxe’s De Vera Differentia set out to accomplish what
Sampson could not, and provide a clear distinction between royal and ecclesiastical authority. He
appeals to scripture as the proper source for understanding these two authorities, and lays out his
argument accordingly, backing up each assertion with scriptural references. First, he spends a
good deal talking about the cases of kingship in the Old Testament, which he uses to assert that
‘God did give with His own mouth kings to be rulers of His people’.273 using the passage from
Matthew 16, Foxe argues that while Christ undeniably gave Peter the keys to the kingdom of
heaven, Peter did not represent the anachronistic Roman bishop, but the universal Church.274
Foxe uses these references and further support from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans to conclude,
among other things, that the temporal authority claimed by the Roman bishops was merely a
result of unchecked tradition, and that evidence from both testaments of scripture confirm that
this power in both matters spiritual and secular belonged to the King alone.
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Finally, Stephen Gardiner’s De Vera Obedientia, Oratio (oration on true obedience)
arrived the next year, in 1535. Of the three, Gardiner’s tract was the most accomplished
intellectually. He begins his Oration on True Obedience by explaining the necessity of
obedience, claiming that “to obeye truly is nothing elles but to obey unto the truthe,” and that
“God is the truthe (as scripture recordeth) wher in he geveth his chief lighte vnto vs.” Therefore,
he equates obedience to God as the true form of obedience, and further references Paul’s epistle
to the Romans that one cannot be truly faithful unless they practice this sort of obedience.275 He
then goes on to explain the relationship between masters and servants, and to express Paul’s
claim that “the autoritie of maistres ouer their seruauntes sholde not be changed or diminished
through professing of Christ.” This allows him to press the matter that in a community of the
faithful, obedience to the Christian ruler in that community is the best way to be obedient to God,
making the king “Goddes lieftenaunt” in the realm and marking the claim that “[t]he kinge…is
headed of the realme but not of the churche” as an absurdity. To support this claim, he inserts the
standard argument from the New Testament that Christ commanded that tribute be paid to Caesar
to affirm that “the dominion and autoritie perteyneth to non but to princes.”276 Further, after
addressing and attempting to disprove pro-papal arguments, he brings in support from the Old
Testament, citing that “Kinge Salomon…ordained the offices of the priesters in their ministeries,
and Levites in their ordre,” to further establish the Biblical tradition that secular rulers possessed
spiritual authority.277 He then goes on to explain the prince in the realm’s authority over the
Church of England as the supreme head of a specific community of the overall church, just as the
kingdoms of France, Spain and Rome are not the whole church but separate congregations of the

275

Gardiner, De Vera Obedientia, 73-5.
Ibid, 97-9.
277
Ibid, 109
276

96

universal church, over which their respective princes are heads.278 Gardiner’s form of obedience
is limitless, requiring that princes be obeyed in all matters, both earthly and spiritual, without
dissent, and that any of his mistakes were not matters for any other man to judge, but that “they
(i.e. princes) have a lorde (i.e. God)…that shall one daye sitte in iudgement even of them.”279
The rest of Gardiner’s De Vera Obedientia is dedicated to denying the spiritual authority
of the Roman bishops. Here he uses familiar arguments, many of which can be found in
Defensor pacis. For instance, to those who would say that “[p]rinces haue acknowlaged the
Bishop of Rome to be the headde of the vniversal churche,” Gardiner retorts that “these dedes
were not hole nor perfite…but had a greater appearaunce of truthe than true in dede and tokens
of honoure rather borrowed than payde.”280 In other words, the honor given by princes to the
early Roman bishops had been manipulated and twisted to justify their contemporary claims to
temporal jurisdiction. He also explains the will of Christ that the points of office of a faithful
priest are “not to beare rule but to be in subieccion not to commaunde princes but to acknowlage
him selfe to be vnder their power and commaundement.”281 While there are plenty of other
examples in which Gardiner defends the prince’s right to be obeyed over the Roman bishops,
these should be enough to suit the purposes of this thesis.
Between these three works, we see a concerted effort from experts in canon law to justify
Henry’s independence from Roman jurisdiction. The remarkable connection, as pointed out by
Chibi, is the influence that Marsilius’ Defensor pacis had on these writers.282 This is evident
from the outset, as all three begin their works by asserting that the only proper source for settling
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matters of political authority in a Christian realm is scripture alone.283 Their entire arguments
rested on this qualification, as did Marsilius’, whose first conclusion asserts the very same
point.284 The similarities go deeper. Marsilius’ seventeenth conclusion (which is one of the few
that Marshall keeps exactly the same) states that “all bishops are of equal authority directly
through Christ, and neither can it be persuaded according to divine law that there is any preeminence or subordination.”285 This point, reinforced by scriptural evidence in the fifteenth and
sixteenth chapters of the second discourse, is echoed by both Foxe and Sampson in their tracts.286
Further evidence that they were influenced by Marsilius is clear in the reinterpretations that were
made of the concepts of potestas ordinis and potestas jurisdictionis (power to ordain and
jurisdictional power). As Skinner explains, each of these writers re-define the meanings of these
terms, twisting the language of canon law against the orthodox canonists.287 Where tradition held
that potestas ordinis and the potestas jurisdictionis both belonged to the Papacy, the Henrician
apologists conceded that while the priesthood is a group set apart with the power to administer
the sacraments, this in no way entitled them to any kind of temporal jurisdictional authority, and
that any claims to such an authority was ‘usurped’. In short, they argue that all jurisdictional
authority falls under secular matters, and that the Church possesses authority but not
dominion.288 The intricacies of this argument are heavily addressed by Marsilius, who concedes
in chapter fifteen of the second discourse that priests are imbued with a sacramental character by
God, but explains in chapter eighteen the ways in which the Roman bishops usurped temporal
jurisdiction over the course of centuries. His necessary conclusion is that “no bishop or priest, as
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such, has any principate or coercive jurisdiction over any clergyman or layperson.”289 Therefore,
there are plenty of examples in which the Henrician apologists took parts of Marsilius’ argument
to supplement or even inform their own. This supports Stout’s assertion that “Marsilius, not
Machiavelli, Wyclif, Erasmus or Tyndale provided the prevailing ideological framework within
which the Henrician Reformation was justified.”290
Understandably, each of these works had their own objective weaknesses. As previously
mentioned, Sampson’s Oratio was written before the legal aspects of the Royal Supremacy had
been made clear. Foxe, while delving deeper into the difference between royal and ecclesiastical
authority, was unable to unwrap himself from the contemporary issue of Henry VIII’s marriage
crisis, and undermined his own purpose by maintaining the pope’s official title in his work,
instead pleading with Clement VII to resolve his relationship with the King.291 Gardiner’s own
argument that scripture does not suggest any limitation to the princely authority has been
criticized as too simple an explanation.292 The important point is that these works were not
perfect justifications of the king’s repudiation of papal authority. Instead, they reflect an effort
among the Henrician regime’s experts on canon law to provide an interpretation of that law that
flew in the face of the entrenched traditions of the Church. Perhaps Marshall’s translation of
Defensor pacis was so readily funded by Cromwell because he believed that it would help to
synthesize these arguments, to be used as a lens through which to view these works, picking up
and providing further explanation where each one fell short.
The backbone, as Quentin Skinner explains, of Cromwell’s propaganda campaign was a
second phase of political tracts, of which Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis was one. Of
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the writers from this phase, Thomas Starkey, Richard Morison and Richard Taverner were some
of the more influential participants. Once the secretary to Reginald Pole, Thomas Starkey seems
to have been in touch with Cromwell about the same time as William Marshall, deserting Pole’s
entourage in Padua to provide written support for the King’s case.293 In 1535, he published An
Exhortation to the People, which instructed ‘them to unity and obedience’.294 Starkey also seems
to have been heavily influenced by Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis, as he wrote to Pole:
Thes thyngs I thynke shal be somewhat in your mynd confermyd by the redying
of Marsilius, whom I take, though he were in style rude, yet to be of grete
iugement and wel to set out thys matter both by the authoryte of scripture and gud
reysonys groundyd in phylosophy and of thys I pray you send me your
iugement.295
Provided here is stark evidence that Marshall’s translation was used by other Henrician
apologists, and even wielded in an attempt to bring Pole to reason.
Morison was the next to leave Pole’s circle in Padua, likely because of the success that
Starkey had in switching sides.296 He would become the most combative of the pamphleteers,
writing and issuing no less than four works in the second half of the 1530s. His Remedy for
Sedition argued that it was sinful to resist the new regime, and his Lamentation showed ‘what
ruin and destruction comes of seditious rebellion’.297 The difference between this group of
writers and the first phase of propaganda was that these were specifically geared to appeal to
popular opinion rather than exclusively the educated elite. This second phase of works were
almost always written in English rather than Latin, and while Sampson, Foxe and Gardiner
tended to focus on a more personal supremacy, these pamphleteers pushed the notion that it must
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be vested in the King in Parliament.298 They also stressed the authority of General Councils,
albeit with advisory instead of executive powers, to help to resolve some of the problems that
had arisen in the last decade,299 which indicates an appeal to a more widespread method of
conflict resolution than those who viewed the struggle in terms of the two central figures. In all,
the work of these pamphleteers was purposed to consolidate the efforts of the canon lawyers
after the aspects of the Royal Supremacy were properly codified, providing a theoretical
framework that retrospectively justified the intricacies of the break with Rome.
Having explained the theoretical discourse in support of Henry, it now remains to explain
the writings of those opposed. As previously mentioned, there was not as much written from an
Englishman’s perspective against Henry’s ecclesiastical supremacy, because the nature of the
regime censored and went so far as to eliminate those who would dissent. This was best
exemplified by the high profile executions of John Fisher and Thomas More. Fisher, who was
the Bishop of Rochester, was implicated for his noncompliance, and his example provides a
glimpse of what might have faced Gardiner if he had not written his De vera obedientia. He was
seen as the staunchest advocate for Catherine of Aragon and critic of the king’s position, writing
a book against the divorce around 1528.300 He would continue his diligence by relentlessly
studying canon law well into the 1530s, admitting in 1535 that he had written and published
several books.301 That Fisher was brave in his repudiation of the Royal Supremacy is perhaps
marred by a bit of imprudence. In 1533, he appealed to the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, to
intervene into the situation. While Bernard claims that it is not clear what exactly Fisher wanted
Charles to do, whether to invade England or to set up a trade embargo, his efforts seem to have
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been noticed by the king.302 Further, upon the imprisonment of Elizabeth Barton, the Nun of
Kent, Fisher was cited by one of those implicated as having wept for joy upon hearing her
prophecies that denounced the king.303 However helpful Fisher may have been in opposition to
the Henry VIII’s divorce, these episodes indicate a lack of diplomatic prudence and strategy that
has not gone unnoticed by historians. That Fisher’s impudence annoyed the king is evident by
the claim of his early biographer that Henry ‘thirsted after his life’,304 which was to become a
common occurrence for those who opposed him. His association with the Nun of Kent,
compounded with a refusal to swear the Oath of Succession was enough to have Fisher sent to
the tower.305 The nail in the coffin was essentially Henry’s refusal that Fisher be allowed to
swear a partial oath, along with the fact that Pope Paul III created Fisher a cardinal in an attempt
to save his life. Upon hearing the news, a proud Henry swore that ‘he would give him another
hat, and send the head afterwards to Rome for the Cardinal’s hat’.306 Perhaps because of Henry’s
pride, but more likely out of necessity that the Act of Succession be enforced, Fisher was
beheaded on June 22, 1535.
Another thorn in Henry’s side was Sir Thomas More, who succeeded Archbishop Wolsey
as Lord Chancellor of England. Once a mentor and friend of the king, More was a famed
Erasmian humanist and, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, a critic of many of the
outdated traditions of the Church. The hinge on which More’s opposition turned was that he
could not reconcile the king’s matter with his own conscience. The origin of this can be traced to
an encounter at Hampton Court Palace in 1527, where in More’s own words Henry ‘laid the
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Bible open before me and there me showed the words that moved his highness and other erudite
persons so to think’.307 While Bernard explains that it is unclear what exact opinion More gave
the king during this encounter, he points out that there is no mention that More had been
convinced to Henry’s case.308 He seems to have spent the following years avoiding having to
take a stance on either side, and though Chapuys reports that he was very much Queen
Catherine’s friend, More commented on Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn that he would ‘neither
murmur at it, nor dispute upon it,’ but ‘faithfully pray to God for his Grace and hers both’.309
Therefore, More did not seem to have found the issue of the divorce as beyond reconciliation
with his conscience, as Fisher did.
Instead, the matter on which More was unable to reconcile was Henry’s claim to be the
supreme head of the Church. It was for this reason, in 1532, that he resigned the chancellorship
in which his conscience would not allow him to remain.310 He engaged in a polemical dispute
against Christopher St German to defend the continued jurisdictional independence and
legislative powers of the Church.311 While professedly guarding his conscience, More tended to
take a neutral stance over the king’s marriage dispute and the act of succession. However, for
some reason or other, More refused in 1534 to swear the oath of succession. His famous silence
toward the matter allowed him to maintain some plausible deniability, which he expressed to
Fisher’s servant that he had not refused to swear to the succession.312 While imprisoned, he
admitted that he was prepared to swear in part, though he was not able to swear the oath he was
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offered.313 It was when he was sentenced at his trial that he finally revealed his conscience,
protesting that his indictment was invalid because it was:
grounded upon an act of Parliament directly repugnant to the law of God and his
Holy Church, the supreme government of which, or of any part whereof, may no
temporal prince presume by any law to take upon him, as rightfully belonging to
the See of Rome, a spiritual pre-eminence by the mouth of Our Saviour himself,
personally present upon earth, only to Saint Peter and his successors.314
This speech was irrevocably damning, as More had finally revealed his conscience to align with
the Papal Supremacy, and though he may not have found Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn
worth protesting, it was the act of Parliament that set that marriage against the unity of the
Church that he could not accept. Henry responded to his one-time mentor’s effrontery with
characteristic impartiality. He was beheaded on July 6, fourteen days after Fisher, protesting that
‘he died the King’s good servant but God’s first’.315
While Fisher and More did not write the formal kind of responses to the Royal
Supremacy that are characteristic of those examined in support, their executions provide
examples of how Henry’s regime responded to domestic opposition. They indicate that at least in
the realm of England, the matter of the Supremacy was a one-way debate, and that any opinions
against it would be forcibly removed. The further significance of their deaths was that they
spurred the most famous of the works written against Henry during his reign, the Pro
ecclesiasticae unitatis (shortened to De unitate) of Reginald Pole.
If there was anyone from the realm of England who would have been able to change the
king’s mind, it would surely have been Reginald Pole. An accomplished theologian, Pole studied
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at the University of Padua between 1521 and 1526.316 He was connected to Henry through
familial ties, as his father was a cousin to Henry VII, and he was directly descended from the
brother of Edward IV. That Pole had the blood of both the Tudors and the Plantagenets in his
veins gave him in many ways, as Joseph Dwyer points out, a better claim to the throne than
Henry himself.317 Whether it was because of his theological clout, or a need to publicly secure a
relative’s allegiance, Henry was eager to obtain some sort of support from his cousin to justify
his divorce. This culminated in an interview in late 1530 or early 1531, where Henry offered
Pole the newly vacant Archbishopric of York,318 if he would give a favorable opinion on the
divorce. Pole respectfully declined the King’s offer, claiming that his conscience would not
allow him to side in favor of the divorce.319 Apparently for Pole, one of the biggest hang-ups was
that he could not act as though two decades of the marriage had not happened.320 However,
instead of staying in England and subjecting him to the same possible fate as Fisher or More,
Pole returned to the continent in 1532 to resume his studies.321 There he remained for the rest of
Henry’s life, and he remained silent on the matter for the first half of the 1530s, while the King
completed his divorce and asserted his supremacy over the church. However, his hand was
forced in 1535, when letters from Thomas Starkey – Pole’s former chaplain turned Henry’s
servant – and Thomas Cromwell reflected the King’s desire that Pole share his opinion on the
“causes of matrimony and concerning the authority of the Pope.” It was the king’s “express
commandment” that Pole use his knowledge and learning to write something favorable for the
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king, avoiding “dissimulation which his Grace most princely abhorreth.”322 It was under this
commission, and in light of the recent executions of Fisher and More, that Pole began to write
the opposite of what Henry wanted, and less than a year later produced the De unitate.
In his book, Pole declares his love for the King while ruthlessly attacking his position and
the writings of his advisors. He characterizes Henry’s actions as an ‘affliction’ or ‘illness’, and
cites his own loyalty and care for the King’s soul as his reason for writing, stating that: “[w]ere I
to keep silent about [Henry’s deeds] I would hardly be doing my duty as a faithful servant.”323
Pole then goes on to attack Henry’s usurpation of the Ecclesiastical Supremacy, largely using
Church tradition as the justification for the continued preeminence of the pope. For instance,
when Pole points out Henry’s claim that the honor of supreme headship was conferred on kings
by the authority of Scripture, he retorts that “among all of your predecessors would there not
have been one king sufficiently attentive and informed in Scripture to note and seize upon such
words so clearly referring to this greatest honor?”324 His argument that can best be described as
condescending is full of further examples that reiterate the traditional Catholic interpretations of
scripture in a way that attempts to make Henry and his advisors foolish and evil. That this lends
confidence to his assertions is evident when he loosely uses a passage from Deuteronomy 32 to
claim that the will of God is reflected in church custom: “Look at the custom of the Church. If
the will of God might be declared in the Church, where could we better understand this than in
the custom of the Church?”325 In this sense, Pole can afford to be slightly careless in his
arguments, as the support of the universal Church and the Christian nations help to prop them up.
This is perhaps the main difference between Pole’s tract and those who wrote in favor of Henry.
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The Henrician theorists saw God’s will as evident through scripture alone, while Pole used
God’s will to justify the thousands of years of papal primacy. We see this in the differing
interpretations of the verses that seem to justify the supremacy of the Roman bishops. In
Matthew 16, Christ says to Peter, “And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven”
and in John 21, “Peter, lovest thou me? Feed my lambs.”326 While Marsilius and the Henrician
apologists would argue that these examples do not necessarily grant any specific authority to
Peter, especially not any sort of coercive temporal authority, the position of the Church as
explained by Pole is that these words present the “most valuable testimony on behalf of Peter’s
entrusted authority.”327 The interpretations that are made by each side indicate the emphasis that
they put on the literal meaning of scripture, and were clearly set up to justify the respective
arguments. All of the theology in the world could not resolve the impasse that resulted from this
difference in viewpoint.
Pole makes his sharpest jabs toward Richard Sampson, using his limited understanding of
how to characterize the Royal Supremacy against him. He uses the vague notion of Valerius
Maximus that “religion be conspicuous in honor in affairs of supreme importance” to conclude
that “imperial decrees have not hesitated to be subservient to things sacred” and “that the
function of the emperor is to be a servant to the priestly function.”328 Further, he declares that it
is God’s will that priests have higher dignity than kings, and that since “the priest prescribes
what the king should do in his royal office, we cannot doubt which of the two is superior.”329 He
also uses the case of the Roman Emperor Nero, asking that if you followed Sampson’s argument
on royal authority to its natural conclusion, “[w]hat other possibility is there except to conclude
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that Nero was head of the Church?”330 Meanwhile, while Sampson is attacked for some of his
logical fallacies and for corrupting Henry’s mind, it bears mentioning that he did pose a
challenge for those who would argue against him to “bring forth evidence from sacred Scripture
for just one kind of power greater than a king’s.”331 While Pole addresses this challenge, and he
brings in plenty of the opinions by the authority of Catholic tradition or the church doctors, he
seems largely unable to present much bare scripture as evidence. The best he can muster is a
commentary on those traditional passages on which the Catholic Church bases the Petrine
Supremacy, though he largely supplements these verses with the centuries of Catholic tradition
by which their interpretation is retrospectively affirmed. Pole’s argument, while passionate,
seems at times to be overwhelmed by his personal disputes with Sampson, and his points on the
Papal supremacy seem more bent toward bringing Sampson and Henry to heel rather than
providing any original argument. If Sampson’s argument can be criticized for its weakness, the
shortcoming of Pole’s argument was his undiplomatic fanaticism.
Needless to say that Pole’s De unitate was not received well in England, though it
remained important to English Catholics for a long time. It was originally meant for the King to
view alone with his councilors, but was eventually printed in 1538.332 Henry’s response to Pole’s
impudence reached farther than just calling for his head. In the later 1530s, Reginald’s family
was implicated for their suspected loyalties. His brother Henry, Lord Montagu, was imprisoned
and eventually executed for the professed reason that ‘someone had to suffer for the annoyance
caused to the king by the rebellious cardinal’.333 Furthermore, his other brother, Sir Geoffrey

330

Ibid, 25.
Dwyer, 41; 27.
332
Bernard, 221.
333
C. Höllger, ‘Reginald Pole and the legations of 1537 and 1539: diplomatic and polemical responses to the break
with Rome’, University of Oxford D. Phil. Thesis (1989), 105, in Bernard, 410.
331

108

Pole, was arrested for corresponding with Reginald without the knowledge of the King’s censors,
warning him that he was in danger of assassination. He eventually cracked under interrogation
and gave up their mother as well. While she never admitted to any kind of treason or to helping
her son overseas, she was accused of treason and executed at the Tower of London.334
Having examined the discourse surrounding the construction of the Royal Supremacy, of
which Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis was merely a part, it is necessary to draw a
couple of conclusions regarding the realities of political writing during this time. First, it seems
that Henry is best characterized as a tyrant, in the way that he encouraged works that supported
the Royal Supremacy, he just as energetically pursued those who spoke against it. For this
reason, Richard Sampson and Edward Foxe enjoyed much more comfortable lives once they
released their respective tracts in support of the King, just as Reginald Pole likely feared for his
life for the rest of Henry’s reign. Marshall would have also ideally benefited from his work, as he
received £12 to translate Marsilius’ work, and he enjoyed royal privilege with other writings.335
Another conclusion that we can make is that these tracts were written with the desire of the two
separate sides to convince the other to their cause, when in reality this would never have been
achievable. The point on which the argument seems to have hinged was not the Royal
Supremacy, but the emphasis that is placed on the authority of scripture. The fact that the two
sides disagreed on the interpretation of scripture ensure that every debated point after that would
further polarize the discussion. It is in this context that we must understand Marshall’s
translation. One can view his omission of the human legislator as a subversion of Marsilius’
political theory, but it is best understood as a necessary measure by a man who understood the
realities of the regime that he was working for, and made the necessary changes to the things that
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would not have been tolerated. In this respect, the omissions and changes that he makes are
actually quite skillfully done, and reflect an educated effort to re-appropriate the work for a
tyrannous hereditary monarch.
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Conclusion
William Marshall’s translation of Defensor pacis is a curious text. On the one hand, it
reflects the prominence and lasting effect that Marsilius’ writing achieved centuries after his
death. On the other, there are core aspects about Marsilius’ original that are completely
disagreeable to the notions of Royal Supremacy cultivated by Henry VIII. So can Marsilius’ antipapal arguments support themselves once the authority of the human legislator has been
substituted to the prince? According to Marshall, they can. At the end of his translation, he
retrospectively states his purpose, “to helpe further and profyte the chrysten cōmen weale,”
which “is and before this tyme hath ben iniustly molested [vexed] and troubled by the spyrytuall
& ecclesyastycall tyraunt.” The reader will find in this work “the Image of these our tymes most
perfytly and clerlye expressed and set out,” and “that euen afore these dayes, euery one of the
beste Emperours hath ben contynually sore vexed & troubled with the same tyrannye.”336
Marshall’s language indicates that he views the usurped coercive jurisdiction of Roman bishops
as a universal issue for all European monarchs. While Marsilius’ anti-papal argument served to
ultimately vindicate disputed claims of a Holy Roman Emperor, Marshall through his numerous
changes argues that these assertions can be extrapolated for any Christian ruler or community
who are ‘vexed and troubled’ by papal ambitions.
Marshall’s omissions and changes to Marsilius’ Defensor pacis reflect an acute
awareness of the intricacies of the English Reformation, which had yet to be fully understood at
the time of its publication. Inherent in this awareness was an expression of the King’s supremacy
that rivaled those of the most learned polemicists employed by Cromwell, as well as a general
skepticism toward certain religious traditions. But to what extent were the religious aspects
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independent of the Royal Supremacy? That Marshall had Lutheran tendencies is well noted
among historians, but some would argue that certain chapters on General Councils and monastic
poverty were left out of his translation because they were incompatible with Henry VIII’s
absolute authority. Viewed through this lens, reliance on a General Council would undermine the
King’s claim to be the Supreme Head of the Church of England, just as the continuance of the
monasteries would have been too reminiscent of papism. Interpretations such as these support the
historiographical tradition that the English Reformation was inherently political, which is why it
often receives less ideological attention than those of Luther or Calvin in the context of the
broader Protestant Reformation.
Parts of this thesis are purposed to suggest the opposite. Along with a detailed analysis of
Marshall’s discrepancies that largely affirms the political thread, it proposes that there were
elements of true religious reform inherent in not only Marshall’s translation, but the English
Reformation as a whole. The skepticism of entrenched Catholic tradition such as the condition of
the monasteries and the superstition shown in the veneration of relics and the importance of
pilgrimage attest to this argument. If Henry’s reformation had been solely purposed to achieve
his divorce and subsequent supremacy, then he would have left these aspects of English religious
life alone once he had achieved this independence from Rome. That he had his ministers conduct
visitations, and did not seem to personally value the power of pilgrimage and pious spending,
suggests that he viewed these religious practices with skepticism. In many ways, the jury is still
out, and we will never know the exact motivations that lay behind the actions of Henry’s
reformation. However, considering Marshall’s understanding of these political and religious
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realities as he translated the Defensor pacis, I agree with Lockwood’s conclusion that “he did not
deserve to be remaindered.”337
Despite Marshall’s efforts, The Defense of Peace did not sell well, as he was unable to
pay back the loan from Cromwell two years later.338 Perhaps this was because of its considerable
length, which made it much more of a commitment to read than the works of the Henrician
pamphleteers. Many of their works, after all, contained distilled examples of Marsilius’
argument. Nevertheless, the fact that Cromwell paid for its production, and that Thomas Starkey
sent it to Reginald Pole for his consideration, reflects the influence of Marsilius’ anti-papal
arguments on established Henrician reformers. This example of the appropriation of the
Defensor pacis to help justify England’s break from Rome stands as a testament to the
importance of Marsilius’ work as a defining text that helped to usher Medieval Europe into the
Early Modern period.
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